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Bug report: Wind, and suggestion

2020.09.01 07:23 paramodulation Bug report: Wind, and suggestion

Bug report: Left Abu Dhabi for Islamabad. Met very high intensity storm,according to radar, but only the wind of 225 at 3. This is similar to what happened during flights in Hurricane Laura.
Conjecture: The software is doing a great job of presenting locations of live storms, but cannot predict wind speeds with the information available to it. Specifically, it is defaulting to a 225/3 windspeed when relevant information is not available. Wind works properly with the preset environmental conditions, but not in live flights.
Solution: If a player is able to receive wind information from the server, receive it (of course). Otherwise, if there is no wind data, go along the second path. When a player enters a region with a certain amount of "weather", add appropriate systems like would be present during the preset weather settings, based on the amount of "weather".
Take the existing system that accurately positions storms and use it to apply various levels of stormy presets based on the pilots position in the storm.
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2020.08.20 13:02 autotldr Pakistan gives go-ahead to Phase 3 COVID-19 vaccine trial

This is the best tl;dr I could make, original reduced by 43%. (I'm a bot)
ISLAMABAD - Pakistan's drug regulator greenlit the country's first Phase 3 clinical trial for a potential COVID-19 vaccine, which is being developed by China's CanSino Biologics and Beijing Institute of Biotechnology.
The trial is slated to begin next month, according to an official who will coordinate the exercise.
Government-run National Institute of Health will be leading the trial for the candidate Ad5-nCoV along with pharmaceutical company AJM - the local representative of CanSino.
China has already approved the vaccine for use by its military after early and mid-stage trials, and further late-stage trials are being lined up for Mexico and Saudi Arabia.
CanSino last month said it was in talks for opportunities to launch Phase 3 trials in Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil and Chile.
Zaheer added the clinical trial will last for "Some months" and the data generated in all participating countries will be collected by CanSino regularly and analysed.
Summary Source FAQ Feedback Top keywords: trial#1 month#2 CanSino#3 Pakistan#4 last#5
Post found in /worldnews.
NOTICE: This thread is for discussing the submission topic. Please do not discuss the concept of the autotldr bot here.
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2020.08.12 12:32 sheldonalpha5 The Kashmir Crisis - A View from Mirpur by Roger Ballard (1991)

THE KASHMIR CRISIS: A VIEW FROM MIRPUR Published in Economic and Political Weekly, 1991 pp. 513 – 517 Roger Ballard Centre for Applied South Asian Studies University of Manchester
“Though the Mirpuris differ little in cultural terms from the Potohari population on the far side of the river Jhelum in Pakistan proper, they tend to be enthusiastic supporters of a Kashmiri entity which would be entirely independent of both India and Pakistan. Yet they have adopted this position not so much as a result of a clear and positive commitment to the cultural distinctiveness of the Kashmir region as a whole, but rather as a con- sequence of their strong sense of disillusionment about the way in which Pakistan has treated them.”
Until recently Azad Kashmir – the narrow slice of territory which is bounded by the rivers Jhelum and Neelum to the West, and the Indo-Pakistani cease-fire line which winds through the high valleys of the Pir Panjal to the East – was largely a forgotten backwater. India has long dismissed Azad Kashmir, with its allegedly autonomous Government based in Muzaffarabad, as nothing more than a puppet of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad; and although Pakistan has always vigorously denied such charges, there can be little doubt that Azad Kashmir has in fact always been kept on a very tight leash.
That is not to say, however, that there has been anything very active about Pakistan's policy with respect to Azad Kashmir. To be sure a careful watch has been kept on Muzaffarabad – above all in order to ensure that over-enthusiastic local politicians did not take an embarrassingly activist position on the prospect of liberating the remainder of Kashmir; but almost all other issues have been put firmly on the back burner.
So, for example, the level of expenditure on rural development has – with the exception of the special, and, as we shall see, largely counter-productive case of the Mangla Hydel scheme – long been a good deal lower in Azad Kashmir than elsewhere in Pakistan; international aid agencies have been denied access, on the grounds that Azad Kashmir is a "sensitive area"; most strikingly of all, these same grounds are used to justify the routine exclusion of information on Azad Kashmir from virtually all public statistics. Even census data remains unpublished.
But if Azad Kashmir remained an overlooked backwater for many years, the current crisis beyond the Pir Panjal together with growing tensions across the cease-fire line, has changed all that. Suddenly that small slice of Kashmir which has claimed Azadi status for the past forty years has gained a position of much greater prominence: articles datelined Muzaffarabad now regularly appear in the Western – and indeed the Indian – Press.
Even so, the journalists who make these reports are invariably primarily concerned with developments within the Kashmir Valley itself, with the scale of the refugee exodus, and with the arming – or non-arming – of potential mujahideen. Few stop to consider what is going on amongst the Azad Kashmiris themselves, nor to explore what position they – and Pakistan – might adopt if India were ever to conclude that an ever more repressive occupation of the Kashmir valley was no longer worth the candle. If it did, by whatever means, break away from India, where would Azad Kashmir then stand? The answers are complex – and paradoxical.
Who are the Azad Kashmiris?
While the Kashmiris of the central valley have, and feel themselves to have, a wide range of cultural and linguistic commonalities, those living on the western slopes of the Pir Panjal are a good deal more diverse. Not only do they have little in common with the Kashmiris of the Srinagar valley – from whom they are almost as sharply differentiated as are from the Dogras of Jammu – but they are also marked, as is only to be expected in such a mountainous region, by a great deal of local diversity. That said, some generalisations can still be made. Prior to 1947 this region was one of the most overwhelmingly Muslim parts of the Maharaja of Kashmir's territories: unlike Jammu where Hindus were and are in the majority, and the Valley with its substantial Brahmin minority, to the west of the Pir Panjal tiny Hindu and Sikh minority was confined to the region's few small market towns. None at all remain today, however, for they all fled to India in 1947.
Yet although Azad Kashmiris are overwhelmingly Muslim, their cultural connections with the Valley proper are few: instead they are best seen as forming the eastern and northern limits of the Potohari Punjabi culture which is otherwise characteristic of the upland parts of Rawalpindi and Jhelum Districts. Even so, this is only to identify their broad location on the cultural map of the region, within which further, more localised cultural variations are still of great significance. So it is that the inhabitants of Azad Kashmir have as yet developed only a very limited sense of their own collective unity, despite having been incorporated into an administrative unit of their own for the best part of half a century.
Caste and Biraderi Divisions
As might be expected, caste and biraderi divisions are still of great importance, but what is also striking is that they have led to the adoption of some strikingly different perspectives on just what it means to be a Kashmiri. So, for example, while most people in the more northerly, Sudhan-dominated areas around Bagh and Rawalakot are just as enthusiastic about identifying themselves as Kashmiris as are those in the southern-most Jat-dominated District of Mirpur (which is also the area with which I myself am most familiar[i]) closer examination soon reveals that their commitment to Kashmir has arisen for quite different reasons, and consequently gives rise to a very different set of objectives.
So, for example, while the Sudhans still remember with pride that it was they who were amongst the first to take up arms in rebellion against the Maharaja's forces[ii], aiming, as they still do, to bring the whole of Kashmir into a wider Pakistan – their slogan is "Kashmir Pakistan banega", the perspective, which most Mirpuris adopt these issues is very different. Paradoxically enough, the Mirpuris tend – even though they differ little in cultural terms from the Potohari population on the far side of the river Jhelum in Pakistan proper – to be enthusiastic supporters of a Kashmiri entity which would be entirely independent of both India and Pakistan – their slogan is "Kashmir Azad banega". Yet as we shall see in a moment, they have adopted this position not so much as a result of a clear and positive commitment to the cultural distinctiveness of the Kashmir region as a whole, but rather as a consequence of their strong sense of disillusionment about the way in which Pakistan has treated them. It is worth exploring in some detail just how this has come about.
Azad Kashmir, Mirpur and Pakistan
In administrative terms Azad Kashmir is only nominally autonomous: from the very outset all important decisions have always had to be cleared by – if they had not already been taken in – the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. Yet although Pakistanis in both official and unofficial spheres have long tended to regard Azad Kashmir as having only the most peripheral significance in the national scheme of things, this region and its population has in fact made a considerable contribution to the economic well-being of country as a whole.
Firstly Azad Kashmir has contributed disproportionately to Pakistan's stock of overseas migrant workers, and hence to the inflow of remittances in foreign exchange.[iii] Such remittances, it is worth emphasising, have played an even more critical role in Pakistan's national finances than in India: in the early 80's, when such remittances reached their peak, they provided well over 50% of the country's foreign exchange earnings, and even today the figure has probably not dropped much below that figure.
Overseas migration – which in Pakistan, as in India, has recently been overwhelmingly targeted on the Middle East –has not, however, been an exclusively Kashmiri phenomenon. But apart from urban outflows from Karachi and to a lesser extent from Lahore, the overwhelming majority of unskilled emigrants from Pakistan have been drawn from the barani (and hence less agriculturally prosperous) areas which sweep in a great arc from Peshawar through Azad Kashmir, Rawalpindi and Jhelum and down to Sialkot. But although emigrants from the more northerly districts of Azad Kashmir are particularly heavily represented in this outflow, they still only constitute a relatively small proportion of the total. Where Kashmiris occupy a very much more prominent position, however, is in emigration to Britain. Somewhere in the region of two thirds of all British Pakistanis are in fact of Azad Kashmiri origin.
Nor has this outflow occurred from across the length and breadth of the region: instead the overwhelming majority of emigrants stem either Mirpur District, or from the southern part of Kotli District which lies immediately to the north of it. In this area the scale of emigration has been truly massive. In many villages well over half the population now lives overseas, with the result, thanks to the remittances they have sent back, that there has been an immense inflow of wealth into these otherwise remote and isolated settlements.
This has had complex, not to say paradoxical, consequences. So it is that although most villages In Mirpur District are now as capital rich – in the village which I myself examined, with resident population of no more than 3,000, the five local Banks had no less than Rs. 5 Crore on deposit – the new wealth has brought some very mixed blessings. In the short run living standards have most certainly risen, but it is equally clear that the inflow of resources has not stimulated real and sustainable economic growth. Most strikingly of all, while Mirpuris now control a plenitude of investment funds, finding secure and profitable ways to deploy them, other than by leaving them on deposit in the bank has proved to be exceedingly problematic, given Mirpur's specific location in the wider political economy of Pakistan.
Mangla and its Consequences
One source of these difficulties is very concretely manifested in the shape of the Mangla Dam, which confines the waters of the rivers Jhelum and Poonch just before they break out into the plains of the Punjab proper. To Pakistan Mangla is a vital asset which brings many benefits: second only to the mighty Tarbela as a source of hydro-electric power, it also serves as the principal water-storage reservoir for the entire canal system West Punjab. Mangla is thus of critical to the success of the Pakistani economy as a whole.
Yet despite the great benefits – in terms of cheap electricity, year-round irrigation and security from flooding – which Mangla has brought to everyone in Pakistan proper, those unfortunate enough to live immediately upstream of the dam have had – as in so many other similar projects elsewhere – to bear the brunt of its environmental costs. It is the Mirpuris who have had to witness the disappearance of much of their most fertile agricultural land, as well as the District's two market towns, Mirpur and Chaomukh, beneath the waters of the lake; it is they, too, who have had to cope with the intensely disruptive impact of the rising waters on the local infrastructure, and particularly on transport and communications.
Infrastructural damage is, of course, an inevitable consequence of all such projects. Yet although a comprehensive effort to make good that damage would have added only a tiny fraction to the overall costs, both the Government of Pakistan and the World Bank – which provided most of the finance for the Mangla scheme – chose to scrimp and save. This was only too obvious to the Mirpuris. Although the dam contractors built a first-class road around the southern (and originally virtually unpopulated) shore of the newly formed lake, the long and winding road around the densely populated northern shore, and which now provided the remainder of the District with its only access to the Plains, was built to a much lower standard, and not fully completed until some years after the water had risen; and it was more than a decade before a bridge was finally constructed across the river Poonch to Tehsil Dadial, which the rising waters of the dam had turned into an isolated peninsula inaccessible to vehicular traffic. As we shall see, much was to turn on this.
The History and Consequences of Emigration from Mirpur
Such a failure to make good the damage caused by large-scale construction projects is, of course, all too common; and if such situations can be expected to produce an upsurge of hostility towards the beneficiaries of such projects, especially when they live elsewhere, then this tendency was yet further reinforced as a consequence of the very high level of overseas migration that has taken place from Mirpur in general and Tehsil Dadial in particular. The interaction the Mangla project and overseas migration has, however, been much more complex than is commonly appreciated. So, for example, although it is regularly assumed that the high level of emigration from the area is a direct result of Mirpuri peasants seeing their land disappear beneath the Mangla Lake, closer examination soon reveals that it is in fact the culmination of a process which had begun many years before the dam was even thought of.
As long ago as the closing decades of the last century, Mirpuri villagers had begun to take jobs as stokers on British merchant ships operating out of Bombay. Just why they began to do so is most obscure, but the most likely explanation is that it was their way of coping with a major disadvantages of their status as Kashmiris: while the Potohar plateau was a major source of recruitment for the British Indian Army, it is clear that the British were most reluctant, except in times of war, to recruit subjects of the Maharaja of Kashmir as soldiers in its Punjabi regiments. So it was that while the sons of small peasant farmers in Rawalpindi and Jhelum Districts were able to supplement their meagre agricultural incomes by signing up as soldiers, their counterparts across the river Jhelum were forced to look elsewhere. Just how they discovered that there was a demand for stokers in Bombay, and who the original pioneers were, I have not yet been able to establish. Once the initial connection was made, however, the rest was easy. The railway station in Gujjar Khan was little more than a days' walk away from most parts of Mirpur District, and having reached Bombay finding work presented few difficulties. By the end of the last century a high proportion of engine room and stokehold sirhangs were themselves from Mirpur.
As Britain's coal-powered merchant fleet continued to expand rapidly during the early decades of this century, so the demand for labour steadily increased, and seamen began to be recruited from an ever larger numbers from an ever wider swathe of villages. As seamen, Mirpuris were in an excellent position from which to keep a close watch on global job opportunities, for the more adventurous amongst them soon began to look for opportunities to work ashore. Getting such jobs was by no means easy, of course, for racial exclusionism was always an obstacle. Nevertheless when acute industrial labour shortages began to emerge in Britain during the course of the second-world war, Mirpuri ex-seamen (many of whom had had their ships torpedoed from beneath them) were eagerly recruited to fill the gaps.
It was these war-time pioneers who formed the bridge-head for further settlement. When opportunities began to widen still further in Britain's subsequent post-war boom, Mirpuri seamen began to leave their ships in ever-increasing numbers. And having established themselves ashore, they began to call their kinsmen over to join them, so unleashing a process of chain migration. As a result over half the population of many Mirpuri villages now lives abroad, while well over half of Britain's Pakistani population– which is now over third of a million strong – stems from this one small area.
Yet if the origins of the Mirpuris migratory initiative long antedated the construction of Mangla Dam, the effects of both, which were further compounded by the area's peripheral political and administrative status, subsequently reacted with each other in an extremely explosive way. By the mid 1970's, Mirpur was in a state of economic ferment. Large numbers of men had left to work in Britain during the previous decade, but few had by then reunited their families overseas. Instead most were still acting as inter-continental commuters, making regular visits back home during which they took the opportunity to invest their accumulated savings – most usually by building splendid new houses for themselves and their families. So great was the volume of remittances during the 1970's that they gave rise to a spectacular, if highly localised and very temporary, economic boom.
No-where was this process more marked than in Dadial Tehsil. Perhaps because it was relatively close to the railway station, many sirhangs had been recruited from Dadiali villages: hence the outflow of migrants, and the consequent inflow of remittances, had been particularly heavy in this area. But at the same time Dadial's physical location ensured that no-one was more conscious than Dadiali returnees of the negative consequences of the Mangla project. Thus instead of taking a Tonga from Mirpur to Chaomukh, they were suddenly faced with a long relatively perilous trip by boat across the new lake, for their homes were no longer accessible by road. And for just the same reasons the costs of house construction were greatly inflated, since all building materials now had to be ferried expensively across the lake from a place which Dadialis now began to describe with ever-increasing dismissiveness as Pakistan.
This sense of hostility, which was fired by their steadily more explicit perception of their exploitation by Pakistan, finally came to a head as a result of a disastrous accident. A boat carrying a marriage party from a very influential family in one of the most affluent of Dadiali villages sank while crossing that part of the river Poonch that should long since have been bridged. More than fifty people were drowned. This proved to be the last straw. An uprising swiftly followed, in which the thana was taken over, the SDM was taken into custody, and, so I was told, Indian flags were ironically raised over public buildings. The Dadialis had had enough.
The rebellion did not last long, of course, for within days the Pakistani state had re-asserted its authority. But the fact that this could only be done by means of a parachute drop – for the area was as inaccessible to military as to civilian vehicles – embarrassingly underlined the rebels' basic argument. The point was taken very swiftly. Within weeks the Army had installed a temporary bridge across the river Poonch, and a more permanent one was completed within the year. At long last Dadial was on the map again. Nevertheless the damage done to public confidence was permanent. To be sure the most pressing grievance had been settled, but many others still rankled. So, for example, many Mirpuris were deeply resentful that despite their considerable contribution to Pakistan's economy through their foreign exchange remittances, no serious effort had been made to stimulate economic and infrastructural development, either in Dadial Tehsil, Mirpur District, or indeed in Azad Kashmir as a whole. And although large sums had indeed been spent on the Mangla project, its beneficiaries were most definitely not Mirpuri. As my informants never failed to emphasise, the benefits of Mangla's electricity were felt in Lahore, and even in Karachi, long before powerlines began to be installed in rural Mirpur. Without such connections, how could they power up fans, let alone the expensive electrical and electronic equipment that so many people had brought back from overseas for their smart new houses?
Kashmiri Nationalism?
So it is that even though the boundary between Azad Kashmir and Pakistan is, in this region, largely artificial in cultural terms – for there are few, if any, linguistic or cultural differences between those who love on either side of the river Jhelum – Mirpuris now feel themselves to be very different from other Potohari Punjabis. They regularly assert that they are Kashmiris, and by that token not Pakistani. They also have the capacity to assert that distinctiveness in places that count: bumper stickers displaying Chinar leaves and the slogan I Love Kashmir are now commonplace on the streets of Birmingham, Bradford and London. This matters: as the British have learned in Ulster, and India with Punjab, the existence of an overseas diaspora means that those back home can always rely on the support of their cousins overseas, and that whenever the going gets tough back home, those developments will swiftly be drawn to the attention of the international media.
Nor is it hard to see why this sense of Kashmiri nationalism should have emerged so swiftly and so vigorously in Mirpur. Given their very reasonable view that Pakistan has not only overlooked their interests, but has unashamedly exploited both their environmental resources and their hard-earned financial assets, their self-definition as Kashmiris, and not as Pakistanis, provides Mirpuris with a powerful means of both expressing and legitimising their grievances.
Hence there is there is a great deal of enthusiastic support both within the District itself – and even more so amongst the overseas Mirpuri diaspora – for the prospect of a Kashmir which is truly Azad. "Kashmir Zindabad! Pakistan Murdabad!" they cry with great enthusiasm.
Yet however genuine these feelings of Kashmiri nationalism may be, they must also be put in context. In the first place they are reinforced by some yet more parochial considerations, not least because the present administration in distant Muzaffarabad – which can be reached much more quickly by way of Islamabad and Murree than along the long winding road through the hills – is not only controlled by non-Mirpuris, but by people who ultimately favour Kashmir's incorporation into Pakistan. So it was that when Sardar Qayyum, an integrationist Poonchi Sudhan who was subsequently to become Chief Minister of Azad Kashmir, sought to speak at an election rally in Dadial in 1985, he faced hostile demonstrations. Only when protected by a substantial military presence could be escorted safely out of town. Such tensions remain to this day.
A Wholly Independent Kashmir?
What are we to make of all this? On the face of it the presence of strongly articulated anti-Pakistani feelings in Mirpur might seem to give succour to those who argue that a wholly independent state of Kashmir which incorporated the overwhelmingly Muslim areas to the West of the Pir Panjal as well as the Srinagar valley itself would form a viable entity. But of this I am extremely doubtful.
First, the strong anti-Pakistani sentiments which are so salient in Mirpur need to be seen as a product of local specificities: they are by no means necessarily shared in other parts of Azad Kashmir. Second, although there is certainly widespread support for greater regional autonomy amongst Azad Kashmiris, just as there is in every other region of Pakistan (and India!), there is no evidence – especially in the light of District-based diversities in interest and biraderi affiliation – that support for a wholly independent Kashmir either is, or even that it might become, either coherent or comprehensive. Thirdly if ever this did occur, or even if it seemed a realistic possibility, the very substantial cultural differences between the Kashmiris of the valley, and the essentially Potohari population to the west of the Pir Panjal would undoubtedly loom increasingly large: given the strength of negative memories of valley-centred Kashmiri rule, the prospects of serious contradictions opening up between the two populations are very strong indeed.
However as a look at the map swiftly reveals, the most substantial obstacle to a comprehensive reunification of a wholly independent Kashmir is essentially geographical. Since a major portion of Pakistan's current Hydel capacity, and the principal reservoir for the entire canal system in West Punjab would be contained within the boundaries of such a State, it would hold a whip hand over Pakistan's entire economy. While bargaining over such issues between two relatively autonomous units within a single federal system would inevitably be fierce, such a process can at least be envisaged: the same cannot be said of a confrontation over the same issues between two wholly independent states. It is for this reason that there is no prospect whatsoever of Pakistan being prepared to allow all of Punjab's immediate submontane tracts to fall under the control of an independent state, whatever the opinions of the local population may be, and however much they may hanker for the creation of a truly Azad Kashmir.
Pluralism, Repression and Nationalism
Are, then, geo-political realities – whether with respect to Mangla, or the entire Srinagar Valley – the only issues that matter? The dominant majorities on both sides do indeed seem to assume the right to tell minorities to put up and shut up should the more specific and more localised interests and concerns of those minorities prove to stand in contradiction to their own. What though, are the consequences of such stances?
What my own experience – which has involved an exploration of the tensions thrown up by the arrival of South Asian settlers in Britain, as well as those surrounding their departure from their rural homes in East Punjab as well as in Mirpur – has led me to conclude is that although locally dominant groups do indeed only too regularly seek to impose their own hegemony over smaller and subordinated minorities, they do so at their peril.
Hegemonic majorities – be they the English in Britain, Hindus in India, or Punjabis in Pakistan – find it all too easy to convince themselves that their demands for minority compliance, which they usually justify as a necessary means of sustaining the integrity of the national order, are simply a matter of common sense. By the same token they feel it is quite in order for them to overlook and ignore any cries of protest which emerge from the minorities, usually on the grounds that they are unnecessary, unrepresentative and inappropriate.
When they find themselves caught up in such situations, minority demands are usually – at least in the initial stages – relatively limited in scope. In the first instance all that is usually sought is a rather more positive recognition of the legitimacy of their distinctive interests and concerns, and their main goal is usually no more than to gain a position of greater autonomy and dignity within the wider social order.
If, however, these requests for a more positive recognition of their distinctiveness are denied, and if, worse still their proposals come to be perceived as an ungrateful and possibly traitorous attempt to undermine the established political, social and cultural order, minorities rarely buckle and submit, no matter how vigorously the majority seek to impose their hegemony. On the contrary the outcome of such efforts – whether the battles are being fought in Bradford, Birmingham, Kashmir, Punjab, or indeed Ayodya – is invariably the very opposite of what was originally intended. In such circumstances minorities invariably become even more determined both to sustain their distinctiveness and to maximise their autonomy and/or independence.
In the midst of such polarisation, majorities which persist in dismissing all forms of minority assertiveness as subversive, anti-national and terroristic will only worsen the situation. To be sure those who advance these self-serving arguments may well succeed in convincing themselves of the righteousness of their own position; but the more they do so, the more they will reinforce the minorities' conclusion that the only way forward is to redouble their efforts to struggle for greater autonomy.
How, then are such contradictions to be resolved? Geographical partition is one option: but as India knows to its cost – and as Britain has now discovered in Ulster – the moth-eaten outcomes of partition may still prove to be just as seriously internally divided as was the whole unit in the first place. Yet if partition is not the answer, what other alternatives are available? Of course there is one solution which is available right at the other end of the scale: genocide. But though this is, sadly enough, a kind of solution which is far from unknown in human history, it is hardly one to be recommended.
Is there a middle path? Despite the viciousness of so many contemporary ethnic conflicts, there can be little doubt that these contradictions can be bridged. But the lessons are everywhere the same. Until the dominant majority – whomsoever it happens to consist of[iv]– is prepared to act with a greater degree of magnanimity, to be more respectful of minority distinctiveness, and to give them much greater scope for the expression of their social, cultural and political autonomy no progress whatsoever will be made. Pluralism is, in other words, the only way forward.
Movement in a pluralistic direction is, however, invariably remarkably difficult to achieve. The reasons are fairly obvious. To unwind such logjams it is always the majority who need to take the first step, above all by acknowledging to itself that it has indeed been acting in a hegemonic way. This is much more easily said than done, for it entails a stripping away of the ideological frameworks which all majorities generate as a means of obscuring their hegemonic tendencies from themselves-whether that be the vision of a civilising mission with which European imperialists cloaked their racism, or the equally chauvinistic notions of 'secularism' which have been used to justify equally oppressive policies in Kashmir and Punjab.
Yet however necessary it may be for dominant majorities to take the first step towards the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory compromise, they invariably prove ex- ceedingly reluctant to do so. Most prefer, instead-witness the current situation in Kashmir, Karachi, Punjab, and UP, let alone in inner-city Britain-to adopt a position of embattled righteousness, little realising that the longer they delay negotiations, the larger that crucial first step will always prove to be. Well entrenched majorities regularly rule out such possibilities on the grounds that they would, by their very nature, undermine the uniqueness of everything they hold most dear-be that a vision of England's sceptred isle, or of the equally mythological dream of Aryavarta. But those who dream such dreams would do well to remember that the further polarisation precipitated by their intransigence can easily have horrific out- comes. If all values whatsoever are swept away in the resulting holocaust that is not the fault of the minorities.

[i] While my own research has focused primarily on Punjabi settlers in Britain, the vast majority of whom originate either from Mirpur or from the Jullundur Doab in East Punjab, I have been involved in two periods of intensive field research in Mirpur District itself, the first for six weeks in 1981, and the second for six months in 1985. It is largely on the basis of that experience that this article has been written.
[ii] An excellent account of this uprising, and of the conflict which followed until the cease-fire in 1948 in A. H. Suharawardy Tragedy in Kashmir Lahore: Wajidalis 1983
[iii] I have set out a more detailed analysis of the history of overseas migration from Mirpur, and of its impact on the local social and economic order in chapters entitled 'The Political Economy of Migration: Pakistan, Britain, and the Middle East' in J S Eades (ed), Migrants, Workers and the Social Order, London: Tavistock 1987, and 'The Effects Of Labour Migration from Pakistan' in Alavi, H and Hariss, J (eds), The Sociology of 'Developing Societies': South Asia, London: Macmillan, 1989
[iv] It should always be remembered that groups who find themselves treated as an excluded minority in one context may well also act, in other contexts, as equally oppressive excluders of others further down the pile than themselves. Jews may, for example, have found themselves subjected to the most vicious forms of anti-semitism in Europe, but this has not prevented them from acting in an equally oppressive manner towards the Palestinians. Numerous examples of the same phenomenon can be found in India.
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2020.08.04 13:04 Qalmahdari Mir Jaffars and Colonialists of today

Enter the Liquidators!

Pakistan is now a target of the ‘predatory global capital’. This global capital has for years seen the Pakistan economy as increasingly dependent on foreign largesse and the State as weak and tottering, run by a self-serving civilian and military elite. In corporate terminology, it is considered a soft target for a hostile takeover, with little possibility of resistance and willing acquiescence from elements within the State apparatus. Collaboration in this regard has been forthcoming for over two decades from a stream of foreign and locally based Pakistani technocrats in the employ of global capital and willing and unwitting Establishment big-wigs and darbari economists and professionals – turncoats a la Mir Jaffars who have no qualms about selling a piece of their country.
Evidence of creeping control of the Pakistan economy emerges from the stream of imported ‘contract technocrats’ – all Pakistanis – brought in to ‘manage’ the economy. The first overt measure in this respect was when Moin Qureshi, ex-World Bank, was flown in to take over as interim Prime Minister for three months in 1993. Muhammed Yaqub, ex-IMF, was appointed Governor of the State Bank and served till 1999. He was followed by Shahid Javed Burki, who flew in to take over as interim Advisor for Finance for three months in 1996-97. These were one-off forays.
The politics contextualizing the more recent turn of events is ominous. During the 1990s, the international financial community’s motivation in imposing their ‘contractors’ for managing the country’s economy appears to be largely financial – to protect the interests of creditor organizations and countries and expand profitable avenues for global capital. The ‘financial managers’ were mandated to force-introduce measures that would stabilize the economy, whatever the costs in terms of income and employment growth.
The 1998 nuclear test was a watershed event that changed the context altogether. The international community viewed Pakistan as too fragile a State and too irresponsible a governance structure to be trusted with nuclear weapons and needed to be ‘defanged’. A new security interest emerged and the post-1993 financial control model appears to have been found to be a useful vehicle to achieve twin aims: neutralizing Pakistan’s nuclear capability via windfall profits for global capital.
The military coup, one year after the nuclear test, triggered an invasion of ‘contract technocrats’ who represented global capital and were placed in charge of the economy. Shaukat Aziz, ex-Citi Bank, flew in to take over as General Musharraf’s Finance Minister in 1999 and was later elevated to the position of Prime Minister. His reign lasted seven years. Three among other ‘contract technocrats’ who were flown in during this period were Hafiz Shaikh, Ishrat Husain and Shamshad Akhter. The former served as Minister for Privatization and the latter two as State Bank Governors. Shamshad Akhter was also appointed caretaker Finance Minister in 2018. Hafiz Shaikh and Ishrat Husain are ex-World Bank and Shamshad Akhter is ex-Asian Development Bank. Hafiz Shaikh was again flown in and appointed Finance Minister in the PPP government. Nadeem-ul-Haque, ex-IMF, was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. Interestingly, the governorship of the State Bank was under the uninterrupted control of former IMF-World Bank-ADB appointees for 16 years from 1993 to 2009.
The post-1999 regimes, packed with ‘contract technocrats’ and supported by local collaborators, oversaw the wholesale transfer of several leading sectors of the economy to foreign interests. The unprecedented scale and speed of privatization of large and lucrative public enterprises in banking, energy, telecommunications, etc., sectors was overseen by Hafiz Shaikh. Global capital made record gains, with an invasion of foreign banks into the country, and the finance sector value addition recording historically high annual growth in excess of 30 percent. It, led by the World Bank, went in to overdrive to support the client military regime, whose economic team resorted to extensive fudging of data to support the mirage of “stellar growth” that was being painted.
Global capital – international lending institutions and rating agencies – continued to paint the ‘rosy’ account of the prospects of the Pakistan economy even during the PML-N’s 2013-2018 era, when all economic indicators were screaming danger. Based on these projections and waivers after waivers granted by the IMF, foreign lending accelerated; saddling the country with a historically high foreign debt burden. Clearly, Pakistan was being given a long rope to hang itself.
Now Hafiz Shaikh has once again been flown in to take over as Finance Minister. State Bank Governor Tariq Bajwa has been forced to resign and Raza Baqir, a serving IMF employee, flown in to take charge of the State Bank. Clearly, global capital has taken direct control of the economy and is not averse to using strong arm tactics to push through its predatory programme. It now appears to have one agenda: to treat Pakistan as the case of a company that has gone bankrupt and been taken over by a court-appointed ‘receiver’, with a singular mandate to liquidate the country’s prime assets at bargain prices. That it is now the turn of natural resources to be sold off is indicated by the fact that Mari Petroleum Company, holding the largest gas field in the country, is on the altar of privatization.
Hafiz Shaikh, veteran auctioneer, and Raza Baqir are global capital’s first line of generals leading the charge and more are certainly likely to follow. History is about to repeat itself. Warren Hastings became the first British governor of the Presidency of the East India Company in 1773, entrenched in Fort William in Calcutta, till the formal British takeover in 1858 and appointment of Lord Canning as Viceroy. There is one difference though. The actors in the 18th-19th century were British, acting on behalf of British interests. The actors today are Pakistanis, acting on behalf of global capital interests. As was the case with the tottering Mughal empire, the elected, democratic PTI government has been reduced to whimpering irrelevance.
The ongoing forced rise in energy and gasoline prices will accelerate inflation, which will then be made the basis of further interest rate rises. The crushing, lacerating impact on the middle class and the poor and on domestic investment, and consequently employment, is being dismissed with an insensitivity that is shocking. These are, in any case, not the concerns of global capital, which actually relishes feeding off the carcasses of the poor.
The impending distress sale of public assets to foreign firms will not just accrue windfall profits for global capital. It will also accelerate the outflow of profits – in dollars – and further aggravate Pakistan’s balance of payments quagmire. Pakistan will be forced to bow and beg for more and more assistance from international lending agencies and private banks, compounding the country’s insolvency. Much is being made of a potential threat of a Chinese ‘East India Company’ emerging out of CPEC. Completely overlooked is the already existing ‘East India Company’ with its Fort William-like presence on Shahrah-e-Jamhooriat in Islamabad.
Parallel to the above stated moves is the role of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which continues to dangle the sword of Damocles over Pakistan’s head by keeping it in the so-called Grey List. Pakistan is increasingly without friends, with enemies nibbling at the border. China has withdrawn its protective hand in the case of Masood Azhar and will not be able to stand by Pakistan for long with respect to FATF. India also has a vote in FATF and exercises a degree of hold over Pakistan. The possibility of India playing a part in influencing the future trajectory of Pakistan’s fortunes cannot be ruled out. Clearly, the objective appears to be to bring Pakistan to the point of bankruptcy where Greece was brought to in 2007-08. The difference being that in Pakistan’s case, the ultimate price is likely to be forced de-nuclearization, with the concomitant foreign domination and control of the national economy and the death of Pakistan’s economic sovereignty.
By Dr Kaiser Bengali
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2020.07.23 20:35 stylemaven1 If Obama had been a Republican, would he be considered one of the greats?

I'm not looking to bicker nor stir the pot, but if you look at the things that happened during Obama's presidency (not the things that he explicitly deserves credit for), it's an interesting list:
Source: Link













  1. McMaken, Ryan. "Homicides in the US Fall for Second Year as Murder Rate Drops in 38 States" MisesInstitute, 10/07/2019, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  2. "2013 Line-of-Duty Officer Deaths: An Overview" International Association of Chiefs of Police, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  1. Vaishampayan, Saumya and Dieterich, Chris. "S&P 500 Closes Above 2000 for First Time" The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26, 2014 4:30 pm ET, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  2. Browning, E.S. "Nasdaq Climbs to a Record, Again Fueled by Tech" The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2015 7:49 pm ET, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  3. Jarzemsky, Matt. "Dow Hits Highest Close Ever" The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2013 7:33 pm ET, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  4. U.S. Census Bureau, Real Median Household Income in the United States [MEHOINUSA672N], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  5. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product [GDPC1], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  6. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Consumer Opinion Surveys: Confidence Indicators: Composite Indicators: OECD Indicator for the United States [CSCICP03USM665S], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  7. U.S. Census Bureau, Retail Sales: Retail and Food Services, Total [MRTSSM44X72USS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  8. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and CCAdj) [CP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  9. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Net domestic investment: Private: Domestic business [W790RC1Q027SBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  10. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Industrial Production Index [INDPRO], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  11. Cook, Tim. "We have begun manufacturing the Mac Pro in Austin. It’s the most powerful Mac ever. Orders start tomorrow." Twitter, 10:48 AM · Dec 18, 2013, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  12. Dunkelberg, William C. and Wade, Holly. "NFIB SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMIC TRENDS, January 2020" NFIB Research Center, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  1. "The Condition of Education: Mathematics Performance" Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, May 2018, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  2. Mitchell, Josh. "Obama Administration to Fund Nontraditional Training for Students" The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 16, 2016 4:00 pm ET, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  1. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings: Total Nonfarm [JTSJOL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  2. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., Total Nonfarm Private Payroll Employment [NPPTTL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  3. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees, Manufacturing [MANEMP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  4. U.S. Employment and Training Administration, Continued Claims (Insured Unemployment) [CCSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  5. "Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Unemployment Rate - Black or African American (LNS14000006)" U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Data extracted on: February 14, 2020 (10:46:35 AM).
  6. "Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Unemployment Rate - Hispanic or Latino (LNS14000009)" U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Data extracted on: February 14, 2020 (10:49:26 AM).
  7. "Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Unemployment Rate - Asian (LNU04032183)" U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Data extracted on: February 14, 2020 (10:51:28 AM)
  8. "Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Unemployment Rate - Women (LNS14000002)" U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Data extracted on: February 14, 2020 (10:53:23 AM)
  1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Industrial Production: Mining: Crude oil [IPG211111CN], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  2. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Industrial Production: Mining: Natural gas [IPN211111GS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  3. "U.S. Nuclear Electricity Generation Capacity and Generation, 1957-2018" U.S. Energy Information Administration, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  4. "U.S. Coal Imports and Exports, 1950-2018" U.S. Energy Information Administration, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  1. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Net farm income, USDA [B1448C1A027NBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  2. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Exports of agricultural goods [B181RC1Q027SBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  3. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Level: Agriculture and Related Industries [LNU02034560], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
Federal Spending
  1. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Surplus or Deficit [-] [FYFSD], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  2. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal government current transfer payments: Government social benefits: to persons [B087RC1Q027SBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  3. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal current transfer receipts: Government social benefits to persons: Medicare [W824RC1], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;, February 14, 2020.
  4. "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)" NATO Public Diplomacy Division, July 10, 2018, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
Foreign Affairs
  1. Bialik, Kristen. "U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades" Pew Research Center via data sourced from Defense Manpower Data Center including historical data from the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), AUGUST 22, 2017, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  1. "Firearms Commerce in the United States: Annual Statistical Update 2019" United States Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  2. "Number of NFA Firearms Processed by Fiscal Year" United States Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  1. "Lawful Permanent Residents 2018 Data Tables" Department of Homeland Security, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  2. Nowrasteh, Alex. "Deportation Rates in Historical Perspective" Cato Institute, September 16, 2019 3:43PM, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
Legislation and Executive Actions
  1. "H.R. 8 (112th): American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012" GovTrack, Jan 1, 2013 at 1:39 a.m. ET. On Passage of the Bill in the Senate, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  2. "Legacy Guidance: The Buy American Provision of the Recovery Act" Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  3. "S. 524 (114th): Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016" GovTrack, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  4. Laura Meckler and Adam Entous in Washington and Zahid Hussain in Islamabad. "U.S. Forces Kill Osama bin Laden" The Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2011 5:17 pm ET, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  5. Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D. "Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans" The Heritage Foundation, October 1, 1989, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  6. "H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" GovTrack, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  7. "H.R. 3230 (113th): Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014" GovTrack, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  8. Wolfgang, Ben. "Obama paid-leave mandate runs into GOP opposition" The Washington Times, January 15, 2015, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  9. "S. 3307 (111th): Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010" GovTrack, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  10. Warrell, Helen. "From Desert Storm to Soleimani: how US drone warfare has evolved" The Financial Times, JANUARY 9 2020, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  11. The Associated Press. "Obama Signs 3 Trade Deals, Biggest Since NAFTA" Reprinted on Fox News, October 21, 2011, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  12. Mauldin, William. "U.S. Reaches Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal With 11 Pacific Nations" The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 5, 2015 5:12 pm ET, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
  13. "H.R. 5566 (111th): Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010" GovTrack, Accessed Feb. 14, 2020.
submitted by stylemaven1 to askaconservative [link] [comments]

2020.06.16 21:25 artistique1 [SUMMARY] Pakistan Procurement 2029


Defense Budget - 33 815 M @ 5.20% of GDP
Procurement Budget - 11 125 M @ 32.9% of Defense Budget
US Defense Aid - 500 M @ Munition support program
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Navy
Name Classification Notes Cost
Krait IV Corvette Keel laid, will be fourth Krait class corvette 220 million
Krait V Corvette Keel laid, will be fifth Krait class corvette 220 million
Krait VI Corvette Keel laid, will be sixth Krait class corvette 220 million
Rahgir Diesel-electric submarine Keel laid, will be first Type 041 submarine 500 million
Raftar Diesel-electric submarine Keel laid, will be second Type 041 submarine 500 million
Rafiq Diesel-electric submarine Keel laid, will be third Type 041 submarine 500 million
Rustam Diesel-electric submarine Keel laid, will be fourth Type 041 submarine 500 million
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Air Force
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
JF-18 Multirole strike fighter 1 N/A 40 million
F-35A 5th gen. multirole fighter 11 N/A 825 million
AF-1 5th gen. air superiority fighter 44 N/A 3 300 million
Equipment to be procured by Pakistan Army
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
Haider Main battle tank 75 N/A 428 million
M1A1 Main battle tank 500 Purchased from old U.S. stock 1 500 million
M1PK MBT Upgrade 450 Upgrades 450 million
MEADS Air defense 2 N/A 2 400 million
HIT Kharan Medium cargo truck 2000 N/A 45 million
Total Spent - 11 595 B @ 99% of procurement budget
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2020.06.12 18:48 Urban-Planner Islamabad needs to grow, but a 60 year old ghost won’t let it

Islamabad needs to grow, but a 60 year old ghost won’t let it

Islamabad Master Plan
The federal capital has gone from a quaint, suburban administrative center to becoming a sprawling metropolis of more than 2 million people. But with the same master plan in place today that was designed for a very different city, it may be time to retire it.
In 1960, Pakistan made the momentous move of shifting its capital from Karachi to Islamabad. Establishing a new center of power and governance is a herculean task in itself, but it was a doubly impressive feather in President Ayub Khan’s cap that the city that was to become Pakistan’s capital was built from scratch.
Rome may not have been built in a day, but Islamabad was built in four years. The magnum opus of celebrated Greek architect Constantinos Apostolou Doxiadis, the founder of ‘Ekistics’ and one of the fathers of the modern city, Islamabad at the time of its founding was the city of the future.
Nestled in the Margalla hills, Islamabad ‘the beautiful’ was conceptualised as a symbol of unity in an ethnically and geographically divided country, and a flag bearer of modernity. But what was envisioned as a cutting edge, sleek, modern capital has since become the victim of insufficient public utilities, lack of affordable housing, commercial and office space, decaying public infrastructure, illegal and haphazard development and mushrooming slums in addition to a rapidly rising cost of living, that disproportionately affects lower income groups.
At the center of this fascinating city that was practically willed into existence is the Islamabad Master Plan. A document that has, in recent times, come under vociferous scrutiny. Its supporters are willing to live and die by it, and its detractors fear it has become redundant and needs revising. With the master plan also came the Capital Development Authority (CDA), which first took charge of the city and its five meticulously laid out zones in 1960.
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SC) took Suo Motu notice of irregular development in Islamabad and directed the government to find a solution for regularizing these constructions. Later, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) in its judgment dated July 9, 2018 directed the government to form a commission to review the Islamabad Master Plan. Consequently, a commission was formed in August 2019 to review the master plan and give its recommendations.
But the commission simply gave recommendations to gloss over the issues in its attempt to maintain the original spirit and architectural integrity of the city. With Islamabad at war with itself over whether to expand to its full potential or continue to cling to its wealthy suburban roots, we look into the short but rich urban history of the country’s capital, and see whether another master plan is needed to revive a city fast losing touch with its character and purpose.
Or for that matter, whether these grand, ‘master plans’ have simply become unviable relics of the past. And if that is the case, how exactly should the city be managed?
Islamabad – an urban planning history
Islamabad was planned as a low density, no-nonsense, administrative unit. But when the city was being formed, Doxiadis was more than just its architect designing roads, buildings and avenues. He was more of a development consultant, building not just the city, but mapping out its future at the same time. And for him, Islamabad could be nothing other than a modern, urban, space.
Scholars of history are often critical of the way cities are presented on maps and in designs by developers and architects that wish to fix them by moving lines on a page. Cartography, after all, is a naturally violent process. When it is exerted upon ancient cities such as Lahore and Peshawar or bustling centers such as Karachi, they do away with the pulse of the street. The streets, as they exist outside of maps, are vascular; if you cut them they bleed.
This is exactly what made Islamabad such a unique experiment. It had none of the scruples of ancient civilizations still haunting its core or colonial customs ruling the roost. It was an opportunity for a clean slate city, one where governance could be different along with city planning. Perhaps the street would not have the same vitality in the beginning as in older cities, but they would be clean and fresh. A beautiful, idyllic space for its new inhabitants to make of it what they will.
At the center of this spirit with which Doxiadis planned Islamabad was the city’s grid iron pattern. There is, fundamentally, a grid dividing the city into 84 sectors, each 4 square kilometres. The other is the ‘natural’ grid created by ravines flowing through the entire site area. Each sector has five sub-sectors – four residential and one commercial (Markaz) – which is encircled by auto routes with pedestrian networks within the sector. Each of the sectors would be low slung and consist of single-family homes, American suburb style.
But the plan that Doxiadis envisaged was restrictive, and clearly could not even have dreamed of how many people would migrate to Islamabad and how extensive the city would get.The master plan included nothing about zoning for the poor, or a city center, a commercial business district (CBD) for that matter.
The vision was definitely futuristic. Cleanly mapped streets with sectors that had everything you would ever need and thus there would be nothing that would require you to over go anywhere outside of your sector. It was all rather mechanical, and the approach was perhaps summed up best in that no office spaces were created apart from the secretariat, and the master plan did not include any plans for expansion. After all, Islamabad was to be a small scale center for governance, with bureaucrats, politicians and government functionaries occupying its homes for the most part.
What happened instead was in-migration has happened far faster than envisaged and Islamabad now has more than 2 million inhabitants. While the CDA and the courts have generally tried to stay true to Doxiadis’ plan, simply stretching and tweaking it when needed, the master plan continues to suffer from its birth defects: no CBD, no room for the poor, and no elongated car dependence.
Where the plan went wrong
It really is not Doxiadis’ fault however, it is simply the nature of master plans everywhere. The problem is, Islamabad’s population has grown far beyond what was once imagined, and it has become a diverse city in terms of the economic and social disparity between its inhabitants as well. However, the desire of the CDA to remain true to the original vision has meant that Islamabad has been over-regulated, limiting both the social and economic potential of the city. The land and building regulations are too rigid, and have resulted in contrived urban development and stifling of economic activities.
As Islamabad grew naturally, the ghost of Doxiadis and his master plan continued to haunt the city, stifling the way it would have grown naturally. Even as the street’s of Islamabad gained the pulse that Doxiadis wanted to avoid, the master plan tried to nip it in the bud – policing the natural growth of the capital from the past.
Where the situation currently stands is that Islamabad has the problem of a significant urban sprawl owing to unrestricted growth in housing schemes and roads over large expanse of land, with little concern for urban planning. At present, the housing backlog in the 2 million strong city is about 100,000 units. This gap is expected to increase by 25,000 units per year, while the current supply of houses is growing at about 3,000 annually. Despite these shocking numbers, the CDA has not launched any new residential sector in the past twenty years. The last sector was launched in 1989, and has not seen any development since then.
The fact of the matter is that there are barriers to sustainable urban development in Islamabad, and part of the problem lies in restrictive zoning that encourages sprawl and single-family homes against high-density mixed-use city centers and residential areas – more in line with the Euclidean zoning which favors single-family residential as the most preferable land use. This leads to inefficient use of land which is a premium asset for any city.
Because of these barriers, Islamabad has become the victim of an urban sprawl, an issue that plagues the modern city and developers. An urban sprawl is essentially the expansion of a poorly planned, low-density, automobile-dependent development, which spreads out over large amounts of land. This puts long distances between homes, stores, and work and creates a high segregation between the residential and commercial uses, with harmful impacts on the people living in these areas.
One would be painfully aware that the entire design of Islamabad was such that people were able to access all necessities within their own sector and not have to venture out of it. When high levels of migration to Islamabad happened, the naturally occurring urban sprawl came in conflict with this philosophy.
The best way to fight this urban sprawl would be to move towards densification of urban areas beyond the core parts of the city. The question, essentially, becomes one of horizontal development versus vertical development. In lay terms, population density is the major driving force of horizontal urban expansion, while fixed investment is the major driving force of vertical urban expansion for the city as a whole.
Densification is a kind of vertical growth that would be against Islamabad’s master plan, and is not an easy task to pull off. However, it is a challenge worth taking on since it leads towards the goal of compact city development. After all, while Islamabad may have been designed in a very particular way, at some point the question has to be asked, are cities made for people or vice versa?
Are master plans a relic of the past?
All of this indicates the need to shake things up from the master place. Densification and changing zoning laws are needed to look after the needs of what Islamabad is fast becoming: a 2-million-strong metropolis. This is where the earlier mentioned Federal Commission for the Review of Islamabad Master Plan, set up by the IHC, should have come in.
Instead, what they did was double down on the 60-year-old plan. The recommendations of the commission continue to look after cars, and to restrict the development of high-rises while hanging onto the suburban model. This was simply an oversight of the fact that Islamabad is no longer a quaint suburban city or a summer capital. It is the seat of power as well as a growing metropolis in its own right.
The commission’s recommendations appear to be oblivious to the needs of the homeless and the needs of the growing metropolis of over 2 million people. But other than their same-old-same-old recommendations about engaging consultants and broad ideas, the commission managed to do very little. In short, after about sixty years since the first plan was made for Islamabad, the city is awaiting a plan that will solve its current problems.
The problem of master plans is a pertinent one. Planners unfortunately are willing to knock down buildings, through court injunctions no less, for being a couple of feet higher than suffocatingly stringent regulations. However, just because planners wish to stick to a more than half century old plan does not mean that the existing nature of the city changes. In fact, when life does not adjust to the old ways, cities and their residents end up in years of strife. That is the reality Islamabad is staring down currently.
Master plans had their place in the world at one point, in fact, they were the modus operandi for how to build cities after the destruction of the Second World War. However, they have fallen out of favour for some time now and for many reasons.
Master plans use present and past data to chart out the trajectory of a city for the next two decades. And while this is a scientifically sound method, it does not take into account the possibility or space for change that may be needed for any reason, and particularly because people are unpredictable. The plans are also static in nature, based on unrealistic assumptions, rigid, and dictate how markets should develop leaving no room for them to find their own level.
But even as the world sheds itself from the constraints of these master plans, in Pakistan, master-planning seems to be an inside job between planners and builders to stay in business. Public participation in the planning process is often perfunctory or nonexistent. These plans, therefore, are never owned by the community nor do planners recognize the needs of the people.
Rethinking the city
The most basic and important argument to allow a city like Islamabad to grow instead of to box it in under countless regulations is that it must be treated as a market. Conceptualising the city as a market that facilitates economic growth means that to help the economy grow, the city must be allowed to grow as well.
As Nadeemul Haque, currently the vice chancellor of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, argued in his Framework of Economic Growth, cities are born out of markets, since markets create order, which manifests itself in the form of cities, based on price signals. And if these basic market units are to help the economy grow, they must be allowed to grow too. Cities that drive productivity and growth are neither neatly planned nor laid out for suburban living and cars. It is the seeming chaotic nature of these cities that drives their productivity and growth.
It is for this very reason that many cities are moving away from master plans to guidelines and rules that allow the needs of the market and investors to determine what should be built. The city planner only worries about social and community needs, public health and safety and other common issues but not with regulating everything in the city, or the economy for that matter.
In addition to this, the city itself must be seen as a source of wealth, not to exploit, but to uplift its inhabitants. Cities often sit on a gold mine of assets that include not just real estate and public utilities but can also create wealth through socio economic uplift of its people and regeneration of decaying urban areas. These assets can be materialized through better city management (Detter and Fölster 2017).
The world is already moving on from restrictive master planning, and it is becoming apparent that the Islamabad Master Plan was a flawed exercise from the very start, made even worse by not reviewing and updating it after every 20 years.
Even as Islamabad fights a status quo that will not allow it to breathe, there are newer methods like neighbourhood planning that are used across the world, and should be employed in Pakistan as well. There is no doubt that the capital is an over-regulated city. It is also not an affordable city for low-income groups to reside in. As the master plan finally goes into the process of being re-evaluated, our suggestion would be a complete paradigm shift in our approach to city management – a shift that should be applied to other cities in Pakistan as well.
Adapted from the PIDE report by Abdullah Niazi
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2020.06.11 09:39 50_Year_Plan_Bro What happened on 9/11? Terror drills which were flipped live, the true role of the "dancing Israelis", the likely type of explosives used to destroy the Towers, and billion dollar bonds. You won't hear about these theories anywhere else.

You will not hear the following theories about what happened on 9/11, anywhere else. This thread is a compilation of some under-appreciated theories (with good references) concerning a September 11th conspiracy that I've investigated over the years. I've put it here into one place. I hope to compile a bunch of sources I've drawn from, soon. This is only a selection of information I can offer.
This thread explains why drone swaps were used and how it was crucial to carry out the false flag, the likely type of explosive used to demolish the three buildings, the real role of the "dancing Israelis" who were arrested on 9/11 (it's not "to document the event"), the blunder of Building 7, a good interpretation of Norman Mineta's testimony about an apparent stand-down order from Vice President Cheney, why 9/11 happened when it did (with some geopolitical context, although Webster Tarpley offers this in greater detail), and real evidence of an air defense stand-down from NORAD General Larry Arnold, which he accidentally revealed to the 9/11 Commission.
1. The “Hijacked” Flights: Flipping Live-Fly Exercises into Real-World Attacks
Major parts of the 9/11 attack were tested in the summer of 2001 (Almagam Virgo ‘01 and other exercises), and the invasion of Afghanistan was drilled in May 2001 under the code-name “Unified Vision ‘01”. This is why the U.S. could invade Afghanistan merely six weeks after 9/11, even though an invasion of that scale would take months to logistically prepare.
The hijacking portion of the attacks was accomplished by turning the numerous live-fly hijack drills which were taking place on 9/11 into real-world attacks through plane duplication. Cell phone calls from a plane were a necessary risk that the plotters took. "Vigilant Guardian", although officially a war game, was closer to a terror drill in that year's scenario, rather than fighting against a hypothetical state enemy's bomber fleet (meant to be Russia's).
Vigilant Guardian was conducted in the airspace of Boston Center, who had a military liaison (Colin Scoggins) who didn't deal with civilian air traffic, but rather was responsible for coordinating paperwork and flight data for all military exercises within their airspace. Considering the scale of the exercises that day, it's hard to see why and how Scoggins was also able to manage civilian flights. It appears that both Delta Flight 1989 and the hijacked flights which took off from Boston Logan partook in these live-fly hijack exercises, serving a slightly varied purpose for each. Incomplete paper which looks into this, I draw from several different authors and many different primary/secondary sources.
For the actual 'hijacked' planes, it appears that one plane (the actual registered aircraft) would be airborne with the actual passengers placing phone calls to the ground, under the false pretext that it was merely an exercise to test whether news of an apparent hijacking would filter through the system quickly enough to trigger a military response (Elias Davidsson’s speculation, from chapter 14 of his book. Chapters 6 to 11 uncovers evidence for plane duplication, oddities/contradictions in the phone calls and the terror drills taking place that day.)
The duplicated drone flight would continue on to its target after the swap. There's evidence that at least Flight 175 and Flight 93 were duplicated. The real Flight 175 (registered as N612UA) flew under several different call signs to air traffic control, including United 177, Delta 89 and United 1898. The airlines tracked the actual registered aircraft via ACARS, the FAA could functionally only track the drone flights (the FAA would be fooled by the different fake call signs and had no radio direction finding to determine the origin of radio calls in en route facilities). The purpose of Delta 1989's false hijack reports seems to be to cover up the existence of a "Delta 89".
Evidence from the phone records indicates that the people who phoned in (airphone + cell) were calling from a fast moving object (different cell tower locations in the same call, see column “RBS Id” on pg. 25), + evidence of picocell (cellular base station) usage to supply cell reception to a limited area from the plane, though the calls were transported thru an onboard air-to-ground system rather than cellular systems.
The airlines installed cellular base stations weeks earlier on the aircraft-to-be-swapped, under the impression those would be used for a 'mere' hijacking drill also. That's why American Airlines management told the operations supervisor to “keep quiet” about the ‘hijack’.
This wasn't necessarily nefarious: the airline management was probably told the exercise was classified, and airlines hold yearly joint exercises with the military and F.A.A. which are under wraps to some extent.
Basically, a cellular base station was plugged into port #4 of the Claircom box on the American Airlines plane, the actual Flight 11/N334AA (the registration # of Flight 11, think of the registration # as referring to the actual plane body, while the Flight # references the particular route that plane is flying. The plane which crashed into the North Tower was likely a remote controlled drone). Ordinarily, you couldn't phone from a plane at altitude – the plane's flying too fast for a cell connection to be reliably maintained. True, you could manage to connect for a period of time, but certainly not anywhere near the reported 24 minutes that flight attendant Betty Ong spent on the phone to AA Reservations.
By the way, you may be wondering, how did the flight attendants on Flight 11 know to use their cell phones, knowing that cell phones didn't work at altitude? And why did they call Reservations and AA Flight Services, rather than an emergency line?
The answer is that the front-end for the seat-back phones was turned off on that particular plane (not all of American's fleet had their seat-back phones decommissioned yet, however). The front end handled call billing, while the back end (Claircom) allowed the seatback phones to talk to the ground, relying on radio ground stations designed for the airfone system. With the front end (billing) system turned off aboard N334AA, calls could no longer be placed to numbers which required payment. The only numbers that could be dialed were thus 1-800 (toll free) or 0 (for operator). Obviously, the callers had been told that cell phones would work on that particular plane, but only for those numbers. They must have been pre-briefed before the "drill" began.
Further, none of the eighty-odd passengers onboard even attempted a call, which strongly suggests that indeed there were no working seat-back phones on American Flight 11. There were passengers who bothered to call their families before take-off for less important matters. Furthermore, Betty Ong advised that she was calling from a jump-seat, which definitely did not have seat-back phones as flight attendants were forbidden by regulations from having unauthorized contact with the outside world during flight.
Of course, the callers weren't on the actual planes which crashed into the Towers. But, the callers had to be airborne, per the drill scenario. Not just calling from the ground. Otherwise, it does raise the question – why bother duplicating the planes? There are several logistical and op-sec reasons I can guess as to why. Briefly —
  1. Hide plot from non-corrupt officers who don't have need-to-know clearance;
  2. Safely maneuver assets which are apparently “only” a simulation while minimizing the chance of the deeper operation leaking out;
  3. Convince those not in on the deeper plot, but whose input is vital to the narrative formation (e.g. air traffic controllers) that what they think happened (i.e. hijackings, plane crashes), actually happened.
The overall solution, then, is to duplicate an asset and invert its role in the exercise. That is, one “asset” is assigned a role closer to a “simulation” on one end, and the other asset is assigned a sacrificial role on the other end. In the case of 9/11, rather than fly a plane in exercise status into the Trade Center (which would give away your plan immediately), you would assign a drone as the duplicated asset, which would continue on to its target. These two roles together bring the “hijacker” narrative to fruition; a hijacking “simulation” of sorts on one end (the “live-fly hijacking exercise” with unwitting participants) and the devastating attack (with a drone flight) on the other end.
There was at least one mole embedded with FAA to help turn the drills on 9/11 live, or to slow down the interceptor response by supplying false information. Colin Scoggins, NEADS liaison to Boston Center on September 11th was responsible for "coordinating paperwork and flight data for all military exercises in Boston Center airspace. I believe he's one of these moles. Dukelin, military liaison to Cleveland Center, is conceivably another mole. Role of military liaisons explained here.
2. Controlled Demolition
The Towers were demolished with industry-standard explosives (PETN and RDX). Primaline 85 detonator cord with a PETN core was installed above the steel floor pans via the electrical wiring ducts in the concrete channels which also ran beside the steel trusses. Detonator cord was possibly also hung above the dropped ceilings.
The cord would remove the building's lateral support when detonated, and also break up the thousands of steel floor pans. This had the peripheral effect of generating intense heat which flash melted the steel trusses (PETN generates temperatures over 7000° F). The molten hot droplets formed via surface tension whilst cooling off in space into the tons of "iron-rich" spheres which were noted by US Geological Survey and RJ Lee Group.
It's my theory that the conspirators relied too heavily on the use of detonator cord in the demolition design. As a result, many of these iron-rich spheres were created when the cord exploded. The sheer volume of spheres found in the dust, and their composition (which is not iron oxide as nanothermite proponents will tell you) suggests it came from a major structural element of the WTC, like the floor systems. The iron micro-spheres are not evidence of nanothermite – the micro-spheres are the 6000 steel floor pans and 40,000 long trusses (and computers, desks, chairs, filing cabinets, maybe even some elevators) of the former World Trade Center.
RDX cutter and kicker charges would be used to cut and kick away the core columns which were located around the elevator shafts; charges would be placed around every three floors. Elevator shafts would be distant from the normal workflow, so the work of the “contractors” installing these explosives would probably go unnoticed. Also, since the Towers were huge buildings and frequently undergoing maintenance of some sort (especially after the ‘93 bombings), some “construction crew” type people carrying out “maintenance” in the buildings would probably be a normal sight at that point. There was a company, likely a CIA front, contracted to “upgrade” the elevator system of the World Trade Center in 2000 – 2001 ( Kevin Ryan documents a “fibre optic cable upgrade” which took place on all floors of the WTC between 1999 and 2000 (cited in the "Conventional Explosives Hypothesis" article above). CAT-5 fibre optic visually looks similar to Primaline 85 cord.
The key demolition elements (detonation cable, RDX cutter and kicker charges) were installed into the Towers under cover of those upgrades. Nanothermite is a disinformation theory (I can expand on this later, since the response would be too long otherwise), as are mini-nukes and directed energy weapons. The purpose of mini-nukes and DEW is primarily to have the nanothermite hypothesis seem reasonable in comparison, although those fringe theories do end up capturing some scientifically illiterate people who are unhappy with the nanothermite theory, but unable to explain why.
But nanothermite is a much more insidious theory, since it has all the requisite trappings of science. The main paper (“Active Thermitic Materials Discovered in WTC Dust”) was published in a brand new, pay-to-publish “journal” with zero impact factor; not submitted to a serious, established journal. The constant invoking of the “energy” which thermite produces and sleight-of-hand fact that it's used “by the military” (as an incendiary to destroy scrap metal, not as a demolition-grade explosive), without mentioning how fast this energy is produced, i.e. not nearly fast enough to produce a destructive shock-wave of around 3000 meters/second, is a common tactic of Truthers who promote nanothermite, knowingly parroting disinfo or not. Steven Jones and Niels Harrit are Sunstein-type disinformation peddlers, breaking up the hard core of a target group (people with energy to devote to 9/11 research) by planting “stylized facts” (thermite, “military-grade”, misleading emphasis on “energy” produced by thermite) to sow confusion and discord, “introducing beneficial cognitive diversity”.
3. 'Israel' Foreknowledge/Involvement
I put quotes around 'Israel' because it's not a real country with a history, only a criminal record. The five “Dancing Israelis” who were arrested on 9/11 were mid-level intelligence assets, part of a larger team of at least five other intelligence front companies (including “Urban Moving Systems”) who were subcontracted by the US intelligence apparatus to move various explosives into the Trade Center and install them under supervision. (Watch the linked video from 24:00 minutes onward, the entire video is pretty good though). The FBI was suspicious, tested their van and it ringed positive for explosives like PETN. The men also blew their cover. “We were there to document the event” is a limited hangout deflection from their real purpose. The actual curious thing one of the Israelis said to the arresting officer was, “America and Israel share the same enemy now. The Palestinians are the problem.”
What to make of this statement? After all, 9/11 was officially carried out by 15 Saudis, an Egyptian, a Lebanese citizen and a citizen of the UAE. The answer is that the Israelis – in this case, a bunch of anti-Arab settlers – were compelled to help transport and install explosives into the Towers on the apparent promise that the eventual attacks would be blamed on Palestine. Hence, “[W]e share the same enemy now – the Palestinians.” Urban Moving Systems and the several other front companies folded after 9/11.
You don't need 25 guys, let alone 5 guys (assuming about 5 teams of 5 men to transport explosives) to “document the event”. It was a deflection from their real role in the 9/11 false flag. Ask yourself this: what happened to the other Israelis who weren’t arrested on 9/11? They went back to Israel under cover, a job well done.
Mossad's other assigned task was to run surveillance against the hijacker patsies to supply plausible denial for the US. It's a layer of an onion that can be peeled off depending on how the story develops and presents problems for US leadership; Saudi Arabia is first to take the blame, then Pakistan, then Israel. The blame can be assigned to Mossad rather than CIA/FBI/NSA, because information wasn't formally passed on from Mossad, even though these 'hijacker' patsies were primarily CIA assets.
A somewhat similar situation is with multiple US intelligence agencies creating their own models of al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Kuala Lumpur independently of one another in the late '90s despite not formally passing on actionable intelligence between agencies, according to one variation of the "intelligence failure" explanation.
4. Building 7's Collapse
Building 7 was meant to fall at 10:45 am. An error in the demolition sequence meant it fell at 5:20 and attracted unwanted attention. The early false collapse reports were an attempt to normalize the abnormal. The collapse of Building 7 would be hidden by the towering dust cloud of Tower 1, which didn't settle until shorty after 11 am. Building 7 held SEC files pertaining to insider trading and would've lifted the veil on “Operation Hammer” and the looting of Soviet industry by oligarchs ten years prior. Operation Hammer is connected to the Black Eagle Trust, itself a merger of stolen Nazi treasures and Yamashita’s gold. The Black Eagle Trust apparently underwrote much of the post-WW2 economic order and funded covert anti-communist operations.
Building 7 was also a possible control room for the South Tower demolition; that's Jeremy Baker's speculation for why the South Tower was destroyed first (Building 7 was further away from the South Tower than from the North, and I guess the RF-type signals from the control room can still travel unimpeded in that path). Guiliani had an Emergency Operations Management Centre on the 23rd floor. This room was abandoned when Jennings & Hess arrived to assume their duties at about 9:00 am.
5. Norman Mineta's Testimony To Cheney's “Stand Down” Order: Limited Hangout/Disinformation
The controversy around Norman Mineta's testimony about people in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) tracking Flight 77 en route to the Pentagon, and Cheney's alleged stand-down order (although Mineta never said it was a stand-down order, and nor would he be allowed to testify to that) revolves around Cheney's assumed role in the larger plot, and not in what Mineta actually said, even though Mineta's testimony is the one which contradicts other government officials and records (not that those other people are incapable of lying), and is also internally inconsistent. Mineta was not in the PEOC with Cheney at 9:27. Cheney arrived to the PEOC around 9:58, Mineta arrived between 10:07 and 10:15 (PEOC shelter log and FOIA released White House photos of the bunker support this). (
Mineta was a witness to events in the PEOC that he understood were not supposed to leak out. However when interviewed, he projected his timeline onto Flight 77, unaware of the contradictions that falsified timeline would generate. I don't buy the theory that Mineta was 'mistaken' and recalling the projected flight path of phantom Flight 93; I think he was describing a real engagement order (not shoot-down order) for a plane that was involved in one of the various live-fly hijack exercises on 9/11. (
How does a phantom go under radar cover or suddenly lose its transponder? Why would the FAA forward info about a projection to the Secret Service at a time when accuracy is crucial? 'Incompetence' theory isn't acceptable here. If Mineta told the truth about Monte Belger and FAA tracking a fifth hijacked plane (possibly identical to the westbound N612UA that was tracked by United Airlines) on its way to Washington, it would reveal evidence of plane duplication -- the key to orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, and undoubtedly damning evidence for an inside operation.
It's possible that Monte Belger was looking at the projected flight path of Phantom Flight 93, but I doubt this. Early reports of United 93 in the New York Times crossing Washington Center airspace don't mention a projected flight path, although this was when the story was still developing and not all facts were yet vetted.
The usual 'conspiratorial' angle that Mineta witnessed a stand-down order from Cheney is actually quite acceptable to the US ruling class, since it's actually a LIHOP ("Let it happen on purpose") angle and doesn't challenge who was in control of the 'hijacked' planes. The actual stand-down order came from Colonel Robert Marr (commander of NEADS). He received a request to launch all of his planes and refused because the planes would've all "ran out of fuel at the same time", so Marr kept them grounded.
6. The Timing of 9/11: U.S. and Pakistani Intel aware of bin Laden’s approaching death; billion-dollar bonds
Why did 9/11 take place on September 11th? It was confluence of factors. Two major factors being that firstly, US intelligence knew that bin Laden, their prized asset that was flipped after 1993 (first World Trade Center bombing) would be dying soon – in weeks to months. US intelligence was monitoring his hospital visits through attachés embedded in Pakistan, and had a literal finger on his pulse:
I. The CBS report by anchorman Dan Rather and foreign correspondent Barry Peterson on CBS Evening News (January 28. 2002). ( The report cites “Pakistani intelligence sources”, saying that “the night before the September 11 terrorist attack, Osama Bin Laden was in Pakistan receiving medical treatment with the support of the very military that days later pledged its backing for the U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan.” Bin Laden was “spirited into this military hospital in Rawalpindi for kidney dialysis treatment.
On that night, says a medical worker who wanted her identity protected, “they moved out all the regular staff in the urology department and sent in a secret team to replace them.” Another hospital employee said: “The military had him surrounded... and I saw the mysterious patient helped out of a car. Since that time, I have seen many pictures of the man. He is the man we know as Osama Bin Laden. I also heard two army officers talking to each other. They were saying that Osama Bin Laden have to be watched carefully and looked after.”
II. SAPRA India (Security And Political Risk Analysis) ( “Independent reports from Islamabad and Peshawar suggest that : bin Laden, who suffers from renal deficiency, has been periodically undergoing dialysis in a Peshawar military hospital with the knowledge and approval of the Inter-Services Intelligence, (ISI) if not of Gen.Pervez Musharraf himself.” (2 July 2001)
III. Janes Intelligence Review ( “According to local intelligence sources, the Pakistani authorities have provided medical facilities for the ailing Bin Laden, including renal dialysis, at a military hospital in Peshawar. None of this will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives who have been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities.” (20 September 2001)
IV. Report by CNN ( “ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (CNN) -- Pakistan's president says he thinks Osama bin Laden is most likely dead because the suspected terrorist has been unable to get treatment for his kidney disease. ‘I think now, frankly, he is dead for the reason he is a... kidney patient,’ Gen. Pervez Musharraf said on Friday in an interview with CNN. Musharraf said Pakistan knew bin Laden took two dialysis machines into Afghanistan. ‘One was specifically for his own personal use,’ he said.” (19 January 2002)
V. Dr. Sanjay Gupta (CNN medical correspondent) who said that the December 2001 video of bin Laden was consistent with such a medical condition (21 January 2002)
I'd say bin Laden was an asset up until his death. And I think bin Laden died not in 2011, but way back in 2001, not too long after September 11th. But Afghanistan harbouring al-Qaeda was a good excuse for the U.S. to invade after 9/11, searching for a man whom the US intelligence community knew was on his deathbed. Thus prolonging the “search” for a ghost as you guard the poppy fields of Afghanistan.
I think OBL dying in 2001 – 2002 is plausible; the leader of the Taliban was revealed in 2015 to have died two years earlier, in 2013. US, Pakistani and Afghani intelligence had mounting doubts about Mullah Omar's continued living during that period. These doubts mirror those publicly expressed by US officials about bin Laden's continued living in the 2001 – 2006 period. Prolonging the apparent life of an intelligence asset to achieve a geopolitical goal is not beyond the reach of US planners who seek to dominate the Middle East.
Older readers may recall that the public reason for invading Afghanistan was that the Taliban was allegedly harbouring bin Laden. This is technically true, but the Taliban did offer to extradite bin Laden if the US supplied proof of his involvement in the attacks. Further, bin Laden claimed that Mullah Omar forbade him from waging terror operations overseas as a condition of his stay. The US rejected the Taliban's terms, and refused to give proof.
I think the plan all along was to pin the blame for the 9/11 attacks on a dead bin Laden and invade Afghanistan with that excuse, knowingly searching for a ghost. This may also explain why bin Laden’s family was airlifted out of the US during the general travel ban in the days following 9/11 – it was an exit package/golden parachute.
The second factor (I believe) for circumscribing 9/11 to that time period was the expiration of billion-dollar securities on September 11th which were connected to insider trading and Operation Hammer from a decade earlier. This is an interesting idea to me that may potentially answer some questions, but I need to look into it more.
Lastly, if 9/11 hadn't happened, another 9/11 would've happened in its place. It wasn't motivated by anti-imperialist reaction (which is what the “blow-back” theory promoted by compromised "dissident" figures such as Chomsky implies), it was endemic to a particular moment of US imperialism and neoliberal capitalism. Why did US imperialism turn to the Middle East? It's not because of the Israeli Lobby or a neoconservative clique of ethnically (not religious) Jewish background.
In the years running up to the false flag attacks, the socialist bloc had been violently overturned by Western capitalist sponsored counter-revolution. The US was running out of enemies – “I'm down to Kim Jong Il, Saddam Hussein, and Castro", complained Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to a reporter sometime in 1992. Yugoslavia, the last socialist hold-out, had been dismembered in 1999.
It was logical for US imperialism to once again turn its attention from the former socialist bloc countries to the Middle East (placed on the back burner after Gulf War I). There was no longer a Soviet Union to restrain US encroachment in the Middle East. That's why the US invaded Iraq twice and Afghanistan, and bombs Libya, Syria and Yemen.
In my opinion, the "Israel Lobby" theory gained prominence in the 2000s (but starts back in the '80s and has earlier prototypes in "Kissinger flouting Nixon" in the '70s) because the socialist bloc that was restraining US imperialism had been illegally dissolved, and "Israel" lost its public justification as an anti-communist bulwark in the Middle East. But 'Israel' did not lose its strategic value to the imperialist ruling class.
So people looking at the situation were confused as to why the US continued to support Israel, because according to their flawed cost-benefit analysis (nation-based rather than class-based), supporting 'Israel' no longer guarantees the security of the US public, although that was never the strategic value which the US ruling class – and not the working class – sees in the Zionist entity.
This is the thesis behind Mearsheimer & Walt's Israel Lobby book – that ignorant Christian Zionists and others with a personal affinity for 'Israel' due to their background, hijacked US foreign policy from the moderate Cold War liberals and continued supporting Israel (and Saudi Arabia) when it was "no longer rational" to do so.
Realists like Mearsheimer and Walt could no longer rationalize why the US ruling class continues to support Israel by signing off ten-year billion dollar aid packages, for example, wrongly believing the relationship to constitute a liability (even though those aid packages are subsidies to the US arms industry to arm what's essentially an extension of the Pentagon).
Thus, cui bono? is the most offensive question to the ruling class clique of bankers, oil companies and arms manufacturers. 'Israel' was involved in 9/11, but it was not the architect or mastermind. It's a useful scapegoat and servant of the imperial-capitalist ruling class (perhaps best represented by the main NATO countries).
Bonus Contribution from Edward Wynkoop: "Major General Larry Arnold Accidentally Revealed to Commission that 9/11 Was An Inside Job"
Here's my theory of what happened on September 11th. It's going to become apparent very quickly that not only is there evidence 9/11 was an inside job, but that debunkers don't know how to deal with a Truther who has vetted his claims.
The two Otis AFB F-15s were suppose to do a patriotic flyover of NYC a few minutes AFTER WTC2 was hit so people would look up & think, “Just missed”. NEADS leadership (Col. Robert Marr) knew EXACTLY where all of the hijacked airliners were with the information coming to him from his superior Gen. Larry Arnold, with whom he was in nearly constant communication.
The Otis AFB F-15s were scrambled perfectly to arrive over the NYC & WTCs several minutes AFTER Flight 175 hit WTC2 IF the pilots had followed protocol & flew SUBSONIC, which they had every reason to think they would, since they were supposed to think their scramble was merely a routine response to the Russian war games that morning (supersonic flight PROHIBITED). But NORAD's leadership didn't know that the pilot (Duffy) had been tipped off that it was real (a hijacking) by the ATC (Dan Bueno) who had called Otis Tower.
Once scrambled the pilots flew, “In the air before the radar kicked in”, “full blower all the way from take off”, “I was SUPERSONIC” [Quote – Pilot Duffy] which meant they would have arrived over NYC BEFORE Flight 175 hit WTC2. NEADS Commander Col. Marr noticed & quickly had them REDIRECTED into a holding pattern over the ocean to WAIT for Flight 175 to hit. They were in that pattern when WTC2 was hit (9:03).
The 9/11 Commission covered it up by moving the dot (location @ 9:03) on the map of the Otis fighter's flight route from it's REAL location WITHIN the holding pattern to just before the holding pattern, but now the numbers don't crunch right. Langley's just too close to DC (6 min by F-16) & they needed an excuse to send the F-16's NE farther away from DC to let FL77 hit from the SW. It was supposed to be Flight 93, but it was 40 min. delayed, so FAA Scoggins made up the Phantom 11 report to cover for the late Flight 93.
Col. Marr put up Langley's Supervisor of Flying Capt. Borgstrum because he would have prevented an SOP scramble & tipped the pilots to FL77 which would have them thinking there were 2 hijacked planes heading towards DC at the same time from opposite directions. That would have sent them straight to DC itself. Gen Arnold repeated original plan to the commission (Langley scrambled for 93) – [2nd public hearing 5/23/03] inadvertently confessing to 9/11.
The main points are:
1. The holding pattern the F15's from Otis AFB where put in, officially claimed to have occurred between 9:08-9:13, actually occurred earlier and was made necessary because the pilots UNEXPECTEDLY flew faster than the conspirators planned.
2. The unexpected 41 minute delay of flight 93 made the 9:21 false 'phantom 11' report necessary because it was Flight 93 that the F16s from Langley were suppose to out chasing to draw them away from Washington, D.C. to allow Flight 77 to hit the Pentagon.
3. Langley's Supervisor of Flying, Capt Borgstrum was ordered to fly in an UNARMED F16 to ensure there was no Supervisor of flying during the Langley scramble. This resulted in the F16 being sent out over the Atlantic and unreachable!
4. NORAD officials made the mistake of repeating the original plan to the 9/11 Commission (Langley scrambled because of Flight 93 – which hadn't even been hijacked yet!). A de facto confession.
Here are sources which corroborate the speculation above, they reference interviews with the people involved + official radar data: and also
I have sources which cite (and credibly support their interpretation of) FBI interviews, 9/11 Commission working papers, radar data, ACARS data, and other important primary and secondary sources, so just ask for them. The above is just a selection of an array of sources I can offer. I will compile them all soon. I hope this was an interesting read, and hope it may have answered some questions.
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2020.06.09 06:29 artistique1 [SUMMARY] Pakistan Military Procurement, 2028


Defense Budget - 30 867 M @ 5.20% of GDP
Procurement Budget - 10 155 M @ 32.9% of Defense Budget
US Defense Aid - 500 M @ Munition support program
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Navy
Name Classification Notes Cost
Type 26 ASW frigate Keel laid, will be first Type 26 500 million
Type 26 ASW frigate Keel laid, will be second Type 26 500 million
Type 26 ASW frigate Keel laid, will be third Type 26 500 million
Krait I Corvette Keel laid, will be first Krait class corvette 220 million
Krait II Corvette Keel laid, will be second Krait class corvette 220 million
Krait III Corvette Keel laid, will be third Krait class corvette 220 million
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Air Force
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
JF-18 Multirole strike fighter 37 Produced 1 480 million
F-35A 5th gen. multirole fighter 11 N/A 825 million
AF-1 5th gen. air superiority 8 LRIP 560 million
Equipment to be procured by Pakistan Army
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
Haider Main battle tank 75 N/A 428 million
M1A1 Main battle tank 500 Purchased from old U.S. stock 1 500 million
MEADS Air defense 2 N/A 2 400 million
Total Spent - 9 353 B @ 92.10% of procurement budget
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2020.06.01 22:01 artistique1 [SUMMARY] Pakistan Military Procurement, 2027


Defense Budget - 28 163 M @ 5.20% of GDP
Procurement Budget - 9 266 M @ 32.9% of Defense Budget
US Defense Aid - 500 M @ Munition support program
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Navy
Name Classification Notes Cost
StG-class V Multirole destroyer Will be fifth Sejong the Great class 923 million
StG-class VI Multirole destroyer Will be sixth Sejong the Great class 923 million
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Air Force
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
JF-18 Multirole strike fighter 37 Produced 1 480 million
F-16V Multirole fighter 9 N/A 525 million
F-35A 5th gen. multirole fighter 11 N/A 825 million
AF-1 5th gen. air superiority 8 LRIP 560 million
Equipment to be procured by Pakistan Army
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
Haider Main battle tank 75 N/A 428 million
M1A1 Main battle tank 500 Purchased from old U.S. stock 1 500 million
MEADS Air defense 2 N/A 2 400 million
Total Spent - 9 564 B @ 97.93% of procurement budget (incl. aid)
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2020.05.27 17:50 deusos [Conflict] Like A Dog For No Reason

Like a dog for no good reason

I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity. - Dwight D. Eisenhower
Taking Stock - China is a paper dragon that can still spit fire
The first attack was a success, but not entirely so. Heavy fighting has erupted in Azad Kashmir and stalled our force’s advance. In Gilgit-Baltistan, we were able to secure Skardu and Gilgit in what can only be described as a total victory. Pakistan has faced massive vehicle losses, specifically in regards to their air power, but has given us the signs of a fast-approaching nuclear ultimatum. Their stance is certainly clear enough - we cannot threaten the security of the Pakistani state any further without potentially resulting in a nuclear attack. Ironically, the on-the-ground map of the war provided by the United Nations is rather muddled in the specifics, and we will be forced to use our own data to describe the specifics of our continuing operation.
We have effectively won. We separated China and Pakistan through the liberation of Gilgit. We avoided, at least in this first instance, Pakistani nuclear weapon usage. We showcased ourselves as a rising major power with serious implications into the future. And we did it in a very short time. What remains left to do is to slightly alter our LOC in Azad Kashmir, and continue with liberating the bulk majority of Gilgit-Baltistan.
And deal with China.
The Chinese have now entered the fight, and this deserves pause and analysis. The actual state of China in 2030 is not it’s strongest point, and it is worth noting severe geopolitical factors that will limit their ability to truly project power in this war. Below, we will get into the fine details of the combat operations themselves, but for a moment we need to consider the geostrategic implications of Chinese-Indian aggression.
The last decade has watched as a hypernationalist Chinese government has alienated the international community. While crucial for maintaining support at home, China’s hostile actions towards its major trade partners has caused billions of dollars in FDI to flee, and Western companies to relocate supply chains elsewhere. Billions of dollars in FDI was not the end - tens of billions in supply contracts, Western tech fleeing the country amidst security concerns both from themselves and their country’s governments, and emigration of skilled labor to work in the West away from the prying eye of Beijing have all been following suit, unchecked, for the better part of an entire decade.
It doesn’t stop there. That alone is enough to assume that the Chinese economy might be sputtering right now. But it doesn’t account for China’s outstanding debt, and their demographic issues.
Neither of these can be understated. By 2030, the largest demographic cohort in China is the 40-44 year olds. Men who are 40 and older account for 27% of their population. Including women, 54.7% of the Chinese population is 40 or older. This cohort cannot reasonably be expected to fight in a war of any kind. They can work in service positions throughout a war economy, but even that doesn’t really shape the picture. The older population of China relies on a massive social security blanket, one that is very expensive and one that is very much in use. The Chinese government must pay to keep these retirees and older workers alive, even though time will dictate that they will become more expensive and less economically useful to the war effort as time goes on.
Speaking of payments, nothing has been done in the last decade to alleviate the very real and very present Chinese debt bubble. Not to be confused with China’s debt trap diplomacy - which for some reason for a brief period of time in the 20’s end up turning into a ploy where they simply gave money away - China’s debt bubble is real, and a real issue. Even as early as 2019, total debt-GDP ratio in China topped 300%, and although national debt still sat at 50%, This isn’t an issue that can be swept under the rug. China’s tax base is shortening, their population is aging out, and eventually they will have to pay for it.
We are very much looking at a China that could face internal disaster if it overcommits to war with India, and although that is not our current goal it must be kept in mind if we continue to defeat China on the battlefield. Beijing is not to be undervalued as a warring party - they are still capable of launching immensely powerful attacks. We should focus on guaranteeing localized air superiority, establishing logistical superiority, and denying Chinese ground combatants from resupply or ease of movement.
[M] this is the only dickwaving part of the entire post, i just wanted to include the source to the title quote [/M]
But we are going to defeat China on the battlefield. They are sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers into a maelstrom they do not belong in and cannot stop. Their action in joining the war makes no sense to us nor the international community, and especially none to a civilian population which has been gagged down from protesting amidst economic stagnation and no internal reform. We are going to mow them down and send what few sons they have home in body bags. We will make their people question why they’re involved in such a stupid conflict, and their people will be right. Because this is modern war. And in modern war, there is nothing sweet nor fitting in your dying. You will die like a dog, for no good reason.

The Kashmir War

Logistics and Support - Defeat in Detail
Wars are won long before they are fought, and they’re also won long after they’re fought. Being able to reinforce Gilgit as easily as one can reinforce Kargil is critical to ensuring that India does not lose localized supremacy in the area. We are deploying an additional 350,000 soldiers into Jammu and Kashmir as well as reinforcing all lost numbers, which will bring the total numerical presence of Indian forces in Kashmir to 1,000,000 soldiers. The roughly 30,000 soldiers who took Gilgit will be reinforced to a massive 450,000 man force, and the 150,000 in Azad Kashmir will be pressed up to 300,000. The remaining 250,000 soldiers will remain in Jammu and Kashmir, providing much needed peacekeeping and support roles.
Logistics is the name of the game. Kashmirs’ winters are deadly and we must take all precautions necessary to secure firm supply lines, even during the winter months. The routes previously used to liberate Gilgit and Skardu will be improved to the same standard that the routes in Jammu & Kashmir were before the operation began. This will help solidify our position, as no other country has more than one road into Gilgit.
Improving Gilgit and Skardu airfields is a longer process, but it is critically important. We will reinforce both airfields to be able to hold 4th and 5th gen fighters as well as strategic transports. With Gilgit and Skardu included, we will have 6 local airfields capable of staging fighter jets out of (with even more when nearby states like Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttarkhand are included), and that can reinforce ground forces through transport jets. China does not operate any significant airfields in the greater Kashmir region, and Pakistan’s only remaining field is in Muzaffarabad, on the eastern side of the city. We are now committing the full weight of the Indian Engineering Corps and all transport aircraft available to move soldiers where they are needed.
Air War - Localized Superiority
China’s attack would have been detected as it were being staged. The specifics of SILENT HOUSE included large amounts of ELINT and SIGINT equipment sortieing both the Chinese and Pakistani borders for good reason - we knew the Chinese may try something and wanted ample time to counter it. SILENT CURTAIN called for the movement of all 80 of India’s 5th Generation Garuda aircraft into Kashmir, and they are on standby in case of this exact threat.
Now it’s time to talk about China’s ability to project air superiority over Kashmir.
Here is a map of all current PLAAF bases. The closest two bases to Kashmir are in Chengdu and Lanzhou. The J-20 has an effective combat radius of 2,000km, the J-16 1,500. Neither of these are within a comfortable range to arrive on site over Kashmir, provide sustained air superiority, and make it home without a risky amount of fuel usage and a heavy dose of pilot fatigue. There are closer, civilian bases that these aircraft could be staged at shown here. but even these 3-4 closer airfields provide a problem of space. These are not the large international airports of Chengdu and Lanzhou, these are local airfields. It would be veritably impossible to operate a 5th generation aircraft out of them without massive retrofitting, the likes of which we have not seen China attempt at all.
China’s long range air refueling fleet is miniscule - only 13 aircraft in total. With 130 fighters expected to sortie from nearly and beyond full combat range, engage against the Indian Air Force which will be in larger numbers, more well rested, and able to stay on site longer, and face the reality of dug in Indian AAA systems, it is numerically, technically, logistically, and humanly impossible for China to maintain air dominance over Kashmir.
That assumes, of course, that the J-20 is a quality stealth jet. The J-20 has known maneuverability and stealth issues that were never properly corrected during its initial testing and implementation phase. India has been able to detect the jet with ease for a decade. The J-20 is less maneuverable during dogfighting too, as its notoriously underqualified engines lack the supermaneuverability provided in the F-22, F-35, Su-57, and yes, the Garuda. In short and in long, there is simply no way that J-20 and J-16 sorties can provide aerial superiority anywhere within Kashmir’s airspace.
The Chinese may be attempting to mitigate this risk by bringing large numbers of AAA, but our focus on ground operations will cover how even these platforms are damned to underperform.
Thus, the name of the game for Indian air superiority is to hold it at all costs. We will reinforce our air superiority fleet with the total quantity of Tejas Mk I and Mk II aircraft, and resupply all downed Su-30’s. Garuda will be pressed into the front lines once production completes, but at the time we already have all Garuda deployed onto the battlefield. All aircraft losses from the first initial combat press will be replaced where possible, with certain numbers bolstered.
Indian Air-To-Ground is free to fire on all Chinese and Pakistani ground forces attempting to enter Gilgit-Baltistan. Our ELINT and SIGINT aircraft overhead should give ample time to see the ground movements - as there are very few ways into Kashmir - and coordinate appropriately sized strike packages.
Aircraft are additionally cleared to engage Chinese AAA on the Chinese side of the border - we still have plenty of SEAD aircraft operating in the area and their primary task will be to continue suppressing Chinese and Pakistani AAA equipment. One hundred IAI Harop loitering munitions will be deployed to the region to hunt down and destroy Chinese and Pakistani SAM assets as they open fire on Indian air assets.
Aircraft available:
Unit Number Category
IAI Harop 100 Loitering SEAD Munition
SEPECAT Jaguar 79 Ground Attack/SEAD
HAL Garuda 77 Stealth Multirole
Mirage 2000TI 29 Multirole
Sukhoi Su-30MKI 234 Air Superiority
Dassault Rafale 27 Multirole
HAL Tejas Mk. 2 60 Multirole
HAL Tejas Mk. 1A 20 Multirole
HAL Tejas Mk. 1 24 Multirole
MiG-21 Bison 75 Interceptor
MiG-29UPG 30 Air Superiority
Beriev A-50EI 3 AEW&C
EMB-145 Netra 2 AEW&C
Global 5000 2 ELINT
Gulfstream III SRA 1 EW/ELINT
Ilyushin Il-78 6 Aerial Refueling
Gilgit-Baltistan - Rush and Resupply
We have had a resounding victory in Gilgit-Baltistan. The Pakistani forces fell apart virtually on contact, and even taking Gilgit itself proved far easier than we were hoping. We hold the Karakoram highway from Gilgit to the Chinese border, and all three passages from China proper into Kashmir. Now we have to continue our consolidation, and prepare for the Chinese attack.
You can't move tanks or troops from Aksai Chin into Kashmir because there's no roads. The mountains are some of the steepest in the world, and there are no passages that a tank or car of any kind can make it through. It literally cannot be done. China’s operation specifically focuses on moving its forces through Gilgit Baltistan, so we should not have to worry about any attack through Aksai Chin.
Which leaves the three passages from China proper into Gilgit-Baltistan. The Khunjerab, Mintaka, and Kilik passes are the only three ways that man can move between Chinese territory proper and Kashmir. Mintaka is the pass that hosts the Karakoram Highway - now under Indian control and halfway bombed to hell. The other two passages are not paved at all, and will result in terrible losses should the PLA attempt to move large quantities of troops through it.
Our objective on our eastern flank is to prevent China from making any headway into Kashmir. To accomplish this, we will continue to airstrike the road close to the Chinese border and ensure that any connections to the three passes are destroyed. Secondly, an advanced force of sappers will mine the Karakoram Highway north of Karimabad, making transit nearly impossible. Karimabad itself will host a 100,000 man advanced force, equipped primarily to defend the city with heavy amounts of AAA, standoff and rocket artillery, and of course, local air support through attack helicopters launched from Skardu and Gilgit.
The Chinese operation seems to be a focus on overwhelming force. This is flawed for two primary reasons. Firstly, Indian intelligence assets will be able to detect, identify, and target any Chinese equipment set up to fire on their side of the border - our air cover will be easily capable of countering this. As for their frontal assault, it’s all coming down one road. The Karakoram highway is the only paved road into Gilgit Baltistan - while a tank doesn’t necessarily need to be on a road to move, it does need fuel. And those fuel trucks will need roads. China is pouring forces through a narrow pathway that we have armed and defended, and through which we have aerial superiority.
Back in Gilgit, the city should be made into a total fortress. Multiple rings of defenses should line the Karakorum Highway going northbound, and our best long-range AAA should be positioned on nearby mountains to detect and defend from PAF and PLAAF aircraft. 250,000 soldiers will be stationed in Gilgit with the expressed purpose of holding the city at all costs.
The last 100,000 men forward deployed into Gilgit will be responsible for securing the western flank. 50,000 men are to proceed towards Chilas, where they will take the city and then both destroy and mine the two roads leading into Pakistan. The other 50,000 men will proceed towards Shandur National Park, where they will mine the Gilgit-Chitral road through the park, taking up just to the east in the small town of Phander.
Unit Number Category
S-400 Triumf 7 Batteries SAM/ABM
Akash Two Regiments (250 launchers + 700 missiles each) SAM
Akash Three Squadrons (125 missiles each) SAM
Kub 90 SAM
S-125 Neva/Pechora 100 SAM
S-200 Angara/Vega/Dubna 100 SAM
9K35 Strela-10 150 SAM
Bofors 40mm Gun 500 AAA
ZSU-23-2 500 AAA
9K22 Tunguska 30 SPAA
ZSU-23-4m “Shilka” 30 SPAA
HAL Sinh 60 Attack Helicopter
HAL Rudra 24 Attack Helicopter
HAL Vyagrha 60 Utility Helicopter
HAL Dhruv 40 Utility Helicopter
T90M 300 MBT
T90S “Bhishma” 300 MBT
Varaha 250 Next Gen MBT
T-72 Ajeya 500 MBT
BMP-2 “Sarath” 800 IFV
Abhay 250 IFV
TATA Kestrel 700 APC
2S35 Koalitsiya-IN 100 SPG
S21 Gvozdika 30 SPG
Pinaka MBRL 30 MLRS
Smerch 9K58 MBRL 20 MLRS
BM-21 100 MLRS
M-46 400 Towed Artillery
D-30 200 Towed Artillery
Tuphanu 300 Towed Artillery
Utility Cars and Trucks A lot Transport
Ground Personnel 450,000 Troops
Azad Kashmir - Line in the Sand
Total victory was the stated goal, but things have changed. Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons is a clear message - if we continue to threaten them, they will do the unthinkable. Our original goal of taking all of Azad Kashmir is still something we look forward to, but at present moment it is something not worth the risk of starting a nuclear confrontation.
Azad Kashmir is different from Gilgit-Baltistan in that it is within a close striking range to Islamabad proper, and thus we have to toe the line much more closely with our actions. Our actions, specifically, should be to reinforce what we have and effectively push the LOC one step closer to the proper border.
We cannot, and will not, be pushing further into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in Azad Kashmir. We have liberated the northern Neelum Valley Road, We have established a foothold to the south. With the war against China ramping up, it would be unwise for us to press towards a brutal siege against Muzaffarabad or New Mirpur City at this time. The additionally reinforced soldiers will be tasked with constructing the required linkages between our newly controlled land, as well as arming, patrolling, and mining the new LOC.
Unit Number Category
S-400 Triumf 7 Batteries SAM/ABM
Akash Eight Squadrons (125 missiles each) SAM
Kub 60 SAM
9K35 Strela-10 100 SAM
S-125 Neva/Pechora 100 SAM
S-200 Angara/Vega/Dubna 100 SAM
Bofors 40mm Gun 300 AAA
ZSU-23-2 300 AAA
9K22 Tunguska 20 SPAA
ZSU-23-4m “Shilka” 30 SPAA
HAL Sinh 50 Attack Helicopter
HAL Rudra 24 Attack Helicopter
HAL Vyagrha 60 Utility Helicopter
HAL Dhruv 40 Utility Helicopter
T90M 50 MBT
T90S “Bhishma” 50 MBT
Varaha 50 Next Gen MBT
Arjun Mk. 1 50 MBT
Arjun Mk. 2 50 MBT
T-72 Ajeya 1000 MBT
BMP-2 “Sarath” 1000 IFV
Abhay 100 IFV
TATA Kestrel 800 APC
2S35 Koalitsiya-IN 40 SPG
S21 Gvozdika 60 SPG
Pinaka MBRL 12 MLRS
Smerch 9K58 MBRL 20 MLRS
M-46 400 Towed Artillery
D-30 200 Towed Artillery
Tuphanu 200 Towed Artillery
Dhanush 200 Towed Artillery
Utility Cars and Trucks A lot Transport
Ground Personnel 300,000 Troops
Nuclear Contingency and Response
With the entry of China into the Kashmir Conflict, Indian High Command has assessed that the risk of a nuclear exchange has increased dramatically. As a result, the Indian nuclear arsenal and anti-ballistic missile shield has been placed on high alert, with launchers and missiles disseminated throughout the entirety of the country to prevent the complete elimination of the Indian arsenal during a Chinese-Pakistani first strike. Perhaps most importantly, the entire Indian SSBN fleet (two Makara-class SSBNs and four Arihant-class SSBNs) has left port equipped with nuclear-tipped K5 and K6 ballistic missiles. The fleet is currently lingering in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
While the Indian Navy has thus far remained uninvolved in the conflict, the surface fleet has been placed on high alert, and is tasked with identifying and tracking any Chinese naval assets (particularly submarines and especially SSBNs). This task should be assisted by Indian listening posts in the Christmas, Cocos (Keeling), and Andaman Island Chains, which give India surveillance capabilities over both the Sunda Strait, the Straits of Malacca, and the Kra Canal. The Indian Navy will not fire unless fired upon or given updates orders by the Ministry of Defence. [S] In the event that the war goes nuclear, the Indian Navy will be tasked with destroying any and all Chinese nuclear submarines that can be found. [/S]
In the name of preventing a nuclear exchange, India has announced a clarification to its nuclear doctrine. While India maintains its no first use doctrine (and calls upon all nuclear states to take this burden upon themselves), India has clarified that for the duration of this war, India will regard any nuclear attack, tactical or strategic, against Indian assets by China or Pakistan as an attack by both countries, requiring retaliation against both countries. [S] With this new doctrine, India hopes that China will place additional pressure upon Pakistan to prevent a nuclear escalation, as the new doctrine means that a Pakistani nuke launched at India or Indian troops will result in a nuclear exchange between India and China as well. [/S]
As a demonstration of its nuclear capability, and in response to Pakistani nuclear tests, India will detonate a 50 kiloton nuclear warhead at its Pokhran Test Range site. This detonation will be announced 24 hours in advance so as to avoid any Chinese or Pakistani false alarms triggering a retaliatory strike.
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2020.05.26 03:22 artistique1 [SUMMARY] Pakistan Military Procurement, 2026


Defense Budget - 25 313 M @ 5.20% of GDP
Procurement Budget - 8 327 M @ 32.9% of Defense Budget
US Defense Aid - 500 M @ Attack helicopter and munition support program
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Navy
Name Classification Notes Cost
PNS Iskander II Multirole frigate Will be fifth Jinnah class 300 million
PNS Iskander III Multirole frigate Will be sixth Jinnah class 300 million
NH90 ASW/Transport helicopter 8 units 320 million
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Air Force
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
JF-18 Multirole strike fighter 45 Produced 1 800 million
F-16V Multirole fighter 9 N/A 525 million
AIM-220A ARHAAM 80 N/A 149 million
Equipment to be procured by Pakistan Army
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
Haider Main battle tank 75 N/A 428 million
Caracal Unmanned ground vehicle 210 N/A 11 million
AH-64E Apache Guard Attack helicopter 48 N/A 1 851 million
Total Spent - 5 684 B @ 64.39% of procurement budget
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2020.05.23 20:00 autotldr Death toll from Pakistan airliner crash 97, black box found

This is the best tl;dr I could make, original reduced by 62%. (I'm a bot)
KARACHI, Pakistan - The flight data recorder from the Pakistani airliner that crashed into a residential neighbourhood of Karachi has been found, an official said on Saturday, as the death toll rose to 97.
Pakistan International Airlines flight PK 8303, an Airbus A320, was flying from Lahore to Karachi with 99 people on board when it went down in mid-afternoon while trying a second landing attempt.
Seconds before the crash, the pilot told air traffic controllers he had lost power from both engines, according to a recording posted on, a respected aviation monitoring website.
Pakistan's prime minister, Imran Khan, announced soon after the crash that there would be an inquiry, and a four-member team was constituted Friday night, according to a notification from the government's aviation division, seen by Reuters.
The team includes three members of the Aircraft Accident and Investigation Board and one from the Pakistan Air Force's safety board.
Friday's crash is the worst air disaster in Pakistan since 2012, when a Bhoja Air passenger aircraft, a Boeing 737, crashed in Islamabad, killing 127 people.
Summary Source FAQ Feedback Top keywords: Pakistan#1 crash#2 air#3 KARACHI#4 Friday#5
Post found in /worldnews.
NOTICE: This thread is for discussing the submission topic. Please do not discuss the concept of the autotldr bot here.
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2020.05.23 16:03 autotldr Death toll from Pakistan airliner crash 97, black box found: authorities

This is the best tl;dr I could make, original reduced by 59%. (I'm a bot)
KARACHI, Pakistan - The flight data recorder from the Pakistani airliner that crashed into a residential neighbourhood of Karachi has been found, an official said on Saturday, as the death toll rose to 97.
Pakistan International Airlines PIAa.PSX flight PK 8303, an Airbus A320, was flying from Lahore to Karachi with 99 people on board when it went down in mid-afternoon while trying a second landing attempt.
Seconds before the crash, the pilot told air traffic controllers he had lost power from both engines, according to a recording posted on, a respected aviation monitoring website.
Pakistan's prime minister, Imran Khan, announced soon after the crash that there would be an inquiry, and a four-member team was constituted Friday night, according to a notification from the government's aviation division, seen by Reuters.
The team includes three members of the Aircraft Accident and Investigation Board and one from the Pakistan Air Force's safety board.
Friday's crash is the worst air disaster in Pakistan since 2012, when a Bhoja Air passenger aircraft, a Boeing 737, crashed in Islamabad, killing 127 people.
Summary Source FAQ Feedback Top keywords: Pakistan#1 crash#2 air#3 KARACHI#4 Friday#5
Post found in /worldnews and /news.
NOTICE: This thread is for discussing the submission topic. Please do not discuss the concept of the autotldr bot here.
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2020.05.21 22:40 zikiweb SEO Services in Lahore, Pakistan.

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2020.05.18 17:36 artistique1 [SUMMARY] Pakistan Military Procurement, 2025


Defense Budget - 22 762 M @ 5.20% of GDP
Procurement Budget - 7 488 M @ 32.9% of Defense Budget
US Defense Aid - 500 M @ Attack helicopter and munition support program
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Navy
Name Classification Notes Cost
Sejong the Great Multirole destroyer Keel laid, will be third StG destroyer 923 million
Sejong the Great Multirole destroyer Keel laid, will be fourth StG destroyer 923 million
PNS Himalaya Aircraft carrier n/a 1 000 million (second installment)
NH90 ASW/Transport helicopter 12 units 480 million
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Air Force
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
F/A-18E/F Carrier-based multirole fighter 13 Locally built, avionics imported 900 million
JF-18 Multirole strike fighter 16 N/A 320 million
F-16V Multirole fighter 9 N/A 525 million
Equipment to be procured by Pakistan Army
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
C-130J Military transport 5 N/A 550 million
Dong Neng 3A ASAT/ABM 1 Final installment 1 200 million
DU Rounds Tank rounds 5,000 N/A 20 million
Total Spent - 6 841 B @ 85.64% of Procurement Budget
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2020.05.12 05:12 maximusvegas45 My US to Pakistan Covid charter flight (PIA) experience and advice

I was lucky enough to come on the first US charter flight (DC Dulles to ISB yesterday), and wanted to share my experience for future travelers as a lot of things are not explained well by the embassy. I know a lot of Pakistanis are still stuck in the US and this is for you. Even Pakistanis in other countries might benefit from some sections of the guide, as no one explained this to me.

Step 1 - Getting the flight
First advice is to call the embassy, dont email them. Use the helpline numbers on the embassy website. Try to get a human on the line, and discuss your situation with them. Highest priority is given to people with contacts (as is everything in Pakistan), so if you have army or civil servant relatives/friends its now the time to use it. Second highest is given to people who have extraordinary circumstances like family death/pregnancy/job loss. Third highest is those who are close to visa expiry. For the rest its first come first serve. Thats why even if you dont fit into any of these categories call them ASAP. And explain your full situation to them, the embassy staff will try their best to help you. For dual citizens use your Pakistani passport obviously, as this charter flight facility is only for us. Also for reference, I was one of those who applied really early (visa was ending) and I kept calling and following up with them.
They will ask you to text/whatsapp them some information like a picture of your passport, Pakistani address, etc. Do this within 10 minutes of the call, as you want to have your data entered while they still have your attention. Its ramazan time so things are slow. Also if you are travelling solo, you have a higher chance of being placed fast, compared to those with family units.

Step 2 - Flight information
After the initial data entry, you will get one more call from the embassy staff who will confirm the ticket once you have been placed on a flight. This call will come 2-3 days after your data entry usually. They will explain to you that you need to go to a NADRA office and have the ticket paid in Pakistan. So yes, you need someone back home who will pay the fees. The cost is around 3 lakh ($1900) for economy ticket. They also sell business class, but honestly if you get it fine, otherwise dont bother, its PIA after all you arent missing much. But do try to get yourself an exit row seat, it requires some extra payment (6k-15k PKR) and you get your boarding pass early on. Imho its totally worth it. Keep this receipt printed or downloaded on your phone, this is your real boarding pass (but you still have to get theirs as well).
On your email you will also receive a payment confirmation email within 24 hours of paying and then another email with the PNR code (the latter is what you need). This is also needed at the airport. Many people on the flight received their PNR codes 3 hours before the actual flight. This is because TSA needs to manually pre-approve everyone, and some names get stuck. Thats why keep waiting for the email even on the flight date and keep your bags ready. Also once the flight is confirmed book a hotel for yourself as Haji camp is tough to live in. I suggest Marriot, as the government as fixed their room and food prices (Rs. 12k per night for 3 nights, where when your test comes negative you get refunded for the remaining nights. Food is fixed at Rs. 800). Have it prebooked via call, so you save a lot of time later.

Step 3 - Packing information
The official rule is 2 luggage bags, 30kg each, and 1 hand carry (I was told the rule at the airport). In reality, NOTHING matters. No one is there counting bags and weighing them. I brought 3 bags each weighing 31kg and no one cared. I may be lucky as I was the first flight but I dont expect them to get better. Even the liquids in hand carry rule does not apply as I brought on a full 1ltr bottle of water (and I suggest you pack one too, since it will be a LONG day). If you are moving out of the country just try to bring the maximum you can. That being said it was just the first flight so they were very relaxed with this, maybe the later flights might be stricter with their rules. Calling the embassy staff wont help as they dont know PIA SOPs, so if you want to take the risk I am just sharing that its possible.
I also highly suggest 2 changes of clothes, and your important medications in your hand carry. They also ask that all bags have luggage tags on them with your name and phone number. Again this is for your convenience and I agree with them, buy some tags off Amazon and have them on. Otherwise they will give you a flimsy sticker tape to use and its risky. For the flight wear very very light clothes. I also suggest you bring some food with you, as the airport will have limited food options. Also pack a pen! you will have some forms to fill and you dont want to be sharing.

Step 4 - Flight day
Like I said keep waiting till you get the PNR and then head to the airport. The flight was at 6 pm (actual take off was at 7:30pm as per usual PIA lateness), people were there at the airport since noon!. Honestly I think thats overkill, but be there around 4 hours earlier than the flight. They will ask for an odd place to group up, for us it was outside Arrivals Gate 5 (call the embassy to know the exact location as they wont email it). Find the embassy people, and stick with them. They are easy to spot as they will be wearing name tags and suits. "Boarding" just means forming a line outside the airport (keep in mind PIA does not have full permission in the US yet so they dont have a counter inside), and then getting a printed out boarding pass. All your luggage bags are expected to be kept right outside arrivals gate next to the road for the trucks to load up (thats really all there is to the checked bags procedure, they wont weigh it or count how many you are bringing). So essentially you just leave your bags next to the other bags, and go to the boarding line. It will put you on a bus to be taken straight to the airplane on the runway.
They will do a basic check (metal detector, empty your pockets, open your bags). They dont care about liquids and I think are just looking for weapons. They didnt have a baggage xray scanner.

Step 5 - Flight itself and arrival
The flight attendants are in full disease prevention suits. They will hand you a mask, gloves and check your temperature before boarding. You are expected to wear the mask and gloves for the duration of the entire flight but realistically most people took them both off within the first few hours. It is very difficult to keep them both on, as the plane was very hot (thats why I told you to wear light clothes). The food will come in sealed boxes and was stale in my experience. I ate my own food. They will serve aftari and sehri only, no snacks.
Once you arrive you will be rechecked for temperature and asked to submit the 2 health forms. Passport processing was super fast. And they take you straight to baggage claim. Bags will come out of order. Bags wont be checked by security. You will then be asked to get on the busses to your respective hotels. Even if you havent booked a hotel, you can still use their bus and book at the hotel. On the US flight I noticed most people were affluent and opted for the hotels, and a majority went to Marriot. The vans are small, so thats why try to get to them fast. At the hotel they will ask you to keep the luggage outside for disinfection. Keep at least the carry on with you (ask them to disinfect it here and now). Reason being its not safe outside and I assume you have expensive things like laptops in it.
Check in was painfully long and slow. But they give preference to those who pre-booked so make sure you mention it. They will ask for a 3 day deposit but will refund you once you get your negative results and let you leave. Once you get in the room, you cannot leave until your results come.
They give you the option of the government doctor for the test, who comes after noon, and it takes 2-3 days for the results. Or you can pay out of pocket for a private test, those cost 8-10k from private labs like Excel and Islamabad Diagnostic. I suggest the latter option. To be tested you have to call the labs and ask them to send someone to your room. It may need some convincing.

Step 6 - Test results and checkout
Thankfully my results just came out clear. Check-out was painless, they refunded me the amount for the rest of the stay. I had to show a pdf of the test results and send it to them via whatsapp. The driver who came to pick me up also had to fill a form.

Some pictures are below as promised:
Waiting at arrivals gate (took the picture before it got crazy crowded)
GEO TV was here
Waiting in bus outside the plane while the luggage was being checked by sniffer dogs
PIA food box
Marriot food menu - with tax its around Rs. 800

submitted by maximusvegas45 to pakistan [link] [comments]

2020.05.12 04:32 artistique1 [SUMMARY] Pakistan Military Procurement, 2024


Defense Budget - 20 580 M @ 5.20% of GDP // 0.2% increase
Procurement Budget - 6 770 M @ 32.9% of Defense Budget
US Defense Aid - 500 M @ Attack helicopter and munition support program
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Navy
Name Classification Notes Cost
PNS Sindh SSBN Keel laid, will be first Sindh class SSBN 1 000 million
PNS Khyber SSBN Keel laid, will be second Sindh class SSBN 1 000 million
PNS Himalaya Aircraft carrier Keel laid, will be sole Himalaya class carrier 1 000 million (first installment)
Equipment to be procured by the Pakistan Air Force
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
F/A-18E/F Carrier-based multirole fighter 13 Locally built, avionics imported 900 million
JF-18 Multirole strike fighter 8 LRIP 320 million
Equipment to be procured by Pakistan Army
Name Classification Quantity Notes Cost
C-130J Military transport 5 N/A 550 million
Dong Neng 3A ASAT/ABM 2 (delivered 2024-2025) Third installment 1 200 million
DF-ZF/DF-17 Missile 24 N/A 576 million
Total Spent - 6 546 B @ 90.04% of Procurement Budget
submitted by artistique1 to GlobalPowers [link] [comments]

2020.05.07 16:39 glad_waters_shallow Can't debug Syntax Error Python3 (Automate the Boring Stuff - Al Sweigart)

I have recently started learning python using Automate the Boring Stuff by Al Sweigart. I am currently at chapter 8 where I'm working on the Random Quiz Generator Project. I changed the US states and capitals dictionary to one containing countries and capitals. Everything else is basically the same. But when I run the program in my laptop, I get syntax error on line 42. Here's the full code:
#! python3 # - Creates 100 quizzes with questions and answers in random order, along with the answer key. import random #The quiz data. capitals = {'Afghanistan': 'Kabul', 'Albania': 'Tirane', 'Algeria': 'Algiers', 'Andorra': 'Andorra la Vella', 'Angola': 'Luanda', 'Antigua and Barbuda': "Saint John's", 'Argentina': 'Buenos Aires', 'Armenia': 'Yerevan', 'Australia': 'Canberra', 'Austria': 'Vienna', 'Azerbaijan': 'Baku', 'Bahrain': 'Manama', 'Bangladesh': 'Dhaka', 'Barbados': 'Bridgetown', 'Belarus': 'Minsk', 'Belgium': 'Brussels', 'Belize': 'Belmopan', 'Benin': 'Porto-Novo', 'Bhutan': 'Thimphu', 'Bolivia': 'La Paz', 'Bosnia and Herzegovina': 'Sarajevo', 'Botswana': 'Gaborone', 'Brazil': 'Brasilia', 'Brunei': 'Bandar Seri Begawan', 'Bulgaria': 'Sofia', 'Burkina Faso': 'Ouagadougou', 'Burma': 'Rangoon', 'Burundi': 'Bujumbura', 'Cambodia': 'Phnom Penh', 'Cameroon': 'Yaounde', 'Canada': 'Ottawa', 'Cape Verde': 'Praia', 'Central African Republic': 'Bangui', 'Chad': "N'Djamena", 'Chile': 'Santiago', 'China': 'Beijing', 'Colombia': 'Bogota', 'Comoros': 'Moroni', 'Costa Rica': 'San Jose', "Cote d'Ivoire": 'Yamoussoukro', 'Croatia': 'Zagreb', 'Cuba': 'Havana', 'Cyprus': 'Nicosia', 'Czech Republic': 'Prague', 'Democratic Republic of the Congo': 'Kinshasa', 'Denmark': 'Copenhagen', 'Djibouti': 'Djibouti', 'Dominica': 'Roseau', 'Dominican Republic': 'Santo Domingo', 'East Timor': 'Dili', 'Ecuador': 'Quito', 'Egypt': 'Cairo', 'El Salvador': 'San Salvador', 'Equatorial Guinea': 'Malabo', 'Eritrea': 'Asmara', 'Estonia': 'Tallinn', 'Ethiopia': 'Addis Ababa', 'Federated States of Micronesia': 'Palikir', 'Fiji': 'Suva', 'Finland': 'Helsinki', 'France': 'Paris', 'Gabon': 'Libreville', 'Georgia': 'Tbilisi', 'Germany': 'Berlin', 'Ghana': 'Accra', 'Greece': 'Athens', 'Grenada': "Saint George's", 'Guatemala': 'Guatemala City', 'Guinea': 'Conakry', 'Guinea-Bissau': 'Bissau', 'Guyana': 'Georgetown', 'Haiti': 'Port-au-Prince', 'Honduras': 'Tegucigalpa', 'Hungary': 'Budapest', 'Iceland': 'Reykjavik', 'India': 'New Delhi', 'Indonesia': 'Jakarta', 'Iran': 'Tehran', 'Iraq': 'Baghdad', 'Ireland': 'Dublin', 'Israel': 'Jerusalem', 'Italy': 'Rome', 'Jamaica': 'Kingston', 'Japan': 'Tokyo', 'Jordan': 'Amman', 'Kazakhstan': 'Astana', 'Kenya': 'Nairobi', 'Kiribati': 'Tarawa', 'Kuwait': 'Kuwait City', 'Kyrgyzstan': 'Bishtek', 'Laos': 'Vientiane', 'Latvia': 'Riga', 'Lebanon': 'Beirut', 'Lesotho': 'Maseru', 'Liberia': 'Monrovia', 'Libya': 'Tripoli', ' \tLiechtenstein': 'Vaduz', 'Lithuania': 'Vilnius', 'Luxembourg': 'Luxembourg', 'Macedonia': 'Skopje', 'Madagascar': 'Antananarivo', 'Malawi': 'Lilongwe', 'Malaysia': 'Kuala Lumpur', 'Maldives': 'Male', 'Mali': 'Bamako', 'Malta': 'Valletta', 'Marshall Islands': 'Majuro', 'Mauritania': 'Nouakchott', 'Mauritius': 'Port Louis', 'Mexico': 'Mexico City', 'Moldova': 'Chisinau', 'Monaco': 'Monaco', 'Mongolia': 'Ulaanbaatar', 'Morocco': 'Rabat', 'Mozambique': 'Maputo', 'Namibia': 'Windhoek', 'Nauru': 'Yaren District', 'Nepal': 'Kathmandu', 'Netherlands': 'Amsterdam', 'New Zealand': 'Wellington', 'Nicaragua': 'Managua', 'Niger': 'Niamey', 'Nigeria': 'Abuja', 'North Korea': 'Pyongyang', 'Norway': 'Oslo', 'Oman': 'Muscat', 'Pakistan': 'Islamabad', 'Palau': 'Koror', 'Panama': 'Panama City', 'Papua New Guinea': 'Port Moresby', 'Paraguay': 'Asuncion', 'Peru': 'Lima', 'Philippines': 'Manila', 'Poland': 'Warsaw', 'Portugal': 'Lisbon', 'Qatar': 'Doha', 'Republic of the Congo': 'Brazzaville', 'Romania': 'Bucharest', 'Russia': 'Moscow', 'Rwanda': 'Kigali', 'Saint Kitts and Nevis': 'Basseterre', 'Saint Lucia': 'Castries', 'Saint Vincent and the Grenadines': 'Kingstown', 'Samoa': 'Apia', 'San Marino': 'San Marino', 'Sao Tome and Principe': 'Sao Tome', 'Saudi Arabia': 'Riyadh', 'Senegal': 'Dakar', 'Serbia and Montenegro': 'Belgrade', 'Seychelles': 'Victoria', 'Sierra Leone': 'Freetown', 'Singapore': 'Singapore', 'Slovakia': 'Bratislava', 'Slovenia': 'Ljubljana', 'Solomon Islands': 'Honiara', 'Somalia': 'Mogadishu', 'South Africa': 'Pretoria', 'South Korea': 'Seoul', 'Spain': 'Madrid', 'Sri Lanka': 'Colombo', 'Sudan': 'Khartoum', 'Suriname': 'Paramaribo', 'Swaziland': 'Mbabana', 'Sweden': 'Stockholm', 'Switzerland': 'Bern', 'Syria': 'Damascus', 'Taiwan': 'Taipei', 'Tajikistan': 'Dushanbe', 'Tanzania': 'Dar es Salaam', 'Thailand': 'Bangkok', 'The Bahamas': 'Nassau', 'The Gambia': 'Banjul', 'Togo': 'Lome', 'Tonga': "Nuku'alofa", 'Trinidad and Tobago': 'Port-of-Spain', 'Tunisia': 'Tunis', 'Turkey': 'Ankara', 'Turkmenistan': 'Ashgabat', 'Tuvalu': 'Funafuti', 'Uganda': 'Kampala', 'Ukraine': 'Kiev', 'United Arab Emirates': 'Abu Dhabi', 'United Kingdom': 'London', 'United States': 'Washington D.C.', 'Uruguay': 'Montevideo', 'Uzbekistan': 'Tashkent', 'Vanuatu': 'Port-Vila', 'Vatican City': 'Vatican City', 'Venezuela': 'Caracas', 'Vietnam': 'Hanoi', 'Yemen': 'Sanaa', 'Zambia': 'Lusaka', 'Zimbabwe': 'Harare'} #Generate 100 quiz files for quizNum in range(100): # Create the quiz and answer key files. quiz_file = open('capitalsquiz%s.txt' % (quizNum + 1), 'w') answerkey_file = open('capitalsquiz_answers%s.txt' % (quizNum + 1), 'w') # Write out the header for the quiz. quiz_file.write('Name:\n\nDate:\n\nPeriod:\n\n') quiz_file.write((' ' * 20) + 'Country and Capitals Quiz (Form %s)' % (quizNum + 1)) quiz_file.write('\n\n') # Shuffle the order of the states. states = list(capitals.keys()) random.shuffle(states) #Loop through all 193 states, writing a question for each for question_num in range(len(states)): #Get right and wrong answers correct_answer = capitals[states[question_num]] wrong_answers = list(caitals.values()) **del wrong_answers[wrong_answers.index(correct_answer)]** wrong_answers = random.sample (wrong_answers,3) answer_options = wrong_answers + [correct_answer] random.shuffle(answer_options) #Write the question and answer options to the quiz file quiz_file.write('%s. What is the capital of %s?\n' % (question_num+1, states[question_num])) for i in range(4): quiz_file.write(' %s. %s \n' % ('ABCD'[i],answer_options[i]) #Write the answer key to the answer key file **answerkey_file.write('%s. %s \n' % (question_num+1, 'ABCD'[answer_options.index(correct_answer)]))** quiz_file.close() answerkey_file.close() print('Task complete') 
I tried changing line 42(second line between two asterisks) by using the good old string concatenation instead of string formatting but the SyntaxError still persisted. So I thought I may have made a mistake in using the index method, but I used the same method in line 31(first line between asterisks), where there seems to be no problem. And also I guess it would be relevant to post that the caret in the error line points towards the c of correct_answer. I really have no idea what's going on. Everything looks fine to my amateur eyes. I have compared my code to the book and it's virtually the same. I seriously need some help right now.
submitted by glad_waters_shallow to learnpython [link] [comments]

2020.05.06 21:40 irraguhil Clerics claim mosques following SOPs, data points otherwise; According to a report in a local daily, the number of people at the Islamabad mosques surged dramatically after the lifting of the ban. It said none of the prayer-goers were following social distancing measures

submitted by irraguhil to worldnews [link] [comments]

2020.05.02 23:29 artistique1 [DIPLOMACY] American Dream


As you might be aware by this time, we are in the process of kickstarting the most ambitious planned city project in the world based around a special economic industrial zone focused on high-tech manufacturing and silicon semiconductor fabrication. As ambitious as this project is, we have a very good feeling about this as our high-potential, high-risk undeveloped sector has all the ingredients required to make a big move into the international tech supply market; all that is needed is the support of some of the largest and most influential tech companies in the world. Megacorporations such as Mitsubishi, Sony, and Panasonic from Japan and Huawei from China have already committed to the project among several others, a clear sign that this project is bound to succeed.
Currently, our manufacturing sector is mostly dependent on natural processed goods and sporting equipment such as linens, clothing materials, surgical instruments, and footballs. The most high-tech of our manufacturing is our growing automotive sector which, while a decent sized export, is still not enough to fully the gear the nation towards an export-oriented economy. The deficit in our trade is quite massive with exports constituting about half of what we import and we believe that an expansion into the alluring and profitable high-tech manufacturing industry could solve this.
You may read more about the SEZ here.
Electronics manufacturing
The American technology sector is renowned across the world for its innovative, reliable, and popular products and services. Their expansion into global developing markets has been a trend since the early dotnet boom and with competitive manufacturing available in more and more countries, domestic manufacturing is being rapidly shifted to locations with more economically favorable wage rates.
With this in mind, we invite Apple Inc. to establish an assembly plant in the SEZ as well as outlets across all major cities such as Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, and Islamabad, as well as the new planned city. As several companies that are currently contracted by Apple to manufacture its components have also been invited to establish foundries in the city, an assembly plant would significantly cut costs as all components of the iPhone and iPad would essentially be produced in the same location. We'd also recommend that manufacturing plants for other Apple products such as the AirPods and accessories also be established in the city to take advantage of unrivaled taxation rates and competitive costs of operation. Taking advantage of the large land area that has been allotted to the city boundaries, we can offer a huge 150 acres campus in the heart of the industrial zone to accommodate offices and manufacturing sites. The site will be able to host upwards of ten thousand employees.
We would like to invite Google to establish a major regional office in the planned city to serve as the headquarters for all operations in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. We can offer Google a land plot of 150 acres to establish a large campus in the city to accommodate upwards of 10,000 employees. We also invite Google to establish at least three factories in the city to manufacture its products to be sold into the international and domestic market as well as an assembly plant for the Google Pixel phones.
Amazon has solidified its position as the foremost leading e-commerce corporation in the world and their recent expansions and forays into new sectors have dramatically enhanced the company's global footprint. Despite the major market present in Pakistan, the company has not implicitly launched operations in the country for whatever reasons. But now, with the planned tech city project already making great strides with several agreements signed with major companies such as Huawei, Mitsubishi, Sony, Rolls-Royce, and BAE Systems to begin direct operations, we believe the time is better than ever for Amazon to enter the large and rapidly growing Pakistani market with a bang. We propose the establishment of a distribution center responsible for delivering products both domestically and, especially, into the international market. The distribution center, the largest of its kind in the region, would be responsible for handling all Amazon business in the Middle East and North Africa region. We also invite Amazon to establish a major factory in the tech city for the manufacturing of its line of Alexa AI personal assistants. These are currently manufactured in China and we believe that our tech hub offers a more cost-effective manufacturing operation due to significantly lower taxes and more favorable wage rates. There is also the case of our governance not being as tariff as some others such as China or India.
We extend similar invites to major tech giants HP Inc. and IBM to begin direct operations through manufacturing and supply in Pakistan. We offer HP to establish three factories in the tech city to manufacture the following products: HP's line of consumer laptops (Pavilion, Envy, and Omen) as well as its line of business laptops (ProBook and EliteBook); the second to produce HP's printers; and the third to manufacture HP business desktop workstations. All products will be marketed towards the global market with the factories significantly enhancing HP's production capabilities due to the lower costs of operation. The same offer is extended to IBM to establish a factory in the tech city for the production of its workstations as well as two data centers such as alphaWorks and SPSS to develop software solutions in data analytics.
Mechanical and automotive manufacturing
We would like to invite Boeing to establish a factory in the planned city for the manufacturing of wings for its major airliners and other aircraft that are offered by Boeing into the global market through Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Secondly, we'd like to offer the company to establish two more factories in the future for the production of jet engines and a major factory to assemble entire Boeing jet airliners.
We would like to invite renowned companies General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and Tesla to establish factories in the planned cities to build products either directly or through subsidiaries such as Chevrolet, Dodge, and Cadillac. We invite these companies to establish at least one plant to enter the Middle Eastern and South Asian automotive market.
Semiconductor fabrication
Now onto the main course. While a hub of electronics and automotive manufacturing and innovation, the main driving force behind the tech city will be the several semiconductor fabrication plants that will be built there. Semiconductor fabrication is both a delicate and a very high-tech sector and is currently dominated by Asian nations such as Taiwan and China. We believe that we have tons of undeveloped potential that could be developed over the course of the next five to seven years, allowing both fabless and IDM to flourish in Pakistan due to lower costs of starting work and the very high returns on the cheap manufacturing in the country. Similar to prior proposals to Nintendo, Sony, BAE Systems, Huawei,and Mitsubishi, we'd like to establish these fab plants at the planned special economic zone in Greater Karachi and across various other cities where foreign investment is more accessible and easy to make due to various incentives. The corporate taxes in the SEZ will be almost none for the first seven years, allowing the invited companies to establish their footprints easily. For this reason, we would like to invite some of the most innovative and export-oriented semiconductor foundries from the US to establish a presence in the SEZ.
We would like to invite Intel, ON Semiconductor, Microchip, Texas Instruments, Micron, and AMD to establish semiconductor and integrated circuits fabrication plants in the tech city. We'd like to propose the establishment of one (or more, if any of these companies wish to do so) in the city for the manufacture and fabrication of semiconductors, microchips, and integrated circuits. Specifically, we'd like Intel to begin building their memory chips (DRAMs, SRAMs), SSDs, and new advanced microprocessors at these new facilities. We extend this same offer to AMD.
Estimated FDI
We estimate that the requested FDI would amount to the following figures, classified according to type.
Type Total FDI
Electronics manufacturing $40 billion
Automotive manufacturing $20 billion
Mechanical manufacturing $12 billion
E-commerce and services $10 billion
Semiconductor manufacturing $60 billion
Total $142 billion
The profits on these investments are expected to be threefold within the next decade.
submitted by artistique1 to GlobalPowers [link] [comments]

2020.04.30 21:03 autotldr Pakistan braced for COVID-19 peak in late June as daily death rate hits record high

This is the best tl;dr I could make, original reduced by 48%. (I'm a bot)
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan would likely see the number of coronavirus disease cases peak around the end of June, the government's planning minister announced on Wednesday as the country recorded its highest daily death rate since the start of the outbreak.
Speaking at a media briefing in Islamabad, Asad Umer, who heads the National Command and Operation Center, said: "On the basis of available data from the last two months and also after analyzing world data, we are expecting the peak of COVID-19 in Pakistan somewhere between the end of June and early July.".
The minister attributed a recent sharp rise in infection rates to increased COVID-19 testing capacity which had risen from around 2,000 to more than 8,000 tests over the past two weeks.
"Right now, the number is above 15,000, but still this data is not conclusive as there may be many other people out there who have not been tested so far," he said, adding that with 26 deaths in the past 24 hours the country had witnessed its highest daily mortality rate, bringing the toll to 335.
In its testing efforts, Pakistan relies on polymerase chain reaction tests, which according to Umer are 70 percent accurate.
The safety of medical staff was one of the key issues for Pakistan in fighting to stop the spread of COVID-19 and Mirza said a special scheme had been set up for them.
Summary Source FAQ Feedback Top keywords: tests#1 Pakistan#2 COVID-19#3 Umer#4 added#5
Post found in /Coronavirus and /worldnews.
NOTICE: This thread is for discussing the submission topic. Please do not discuss the concept of the autotldr bot here.
submitted by autotldr to autotldr [link] [comments]

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